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INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds1 are the most popular retail investment in America,2 a 
testament to the simplicity and transparency of the mutual fund concept. A 
mutual fund investor owns a share of common stock issued by a company 
that invests in debt or equity securities issued by other operating 
companies.3 Like operating companies, a mutual fund distinguishes itself 
by its business objective—for example, to exceed the Standard & Poor’s 
500 Index (an equity fund), to match the Lehman Brothers Aggregate 
Bond Index (a bond fund), or to maintain a current net asset value of $1.00 
 1. Technically, a mutual fund is an open-end management company registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) under the Investment Company Act 
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (2000) (the “Investment Company Act”). An “open-end company” 
is a management company that issues a redeemable security. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1). The term 
“redeemable security” is defined in section 2(a)(32) of the Investment Company Act to mean a 
security the terms of which entitle the holder, upon presentation, “to receive approximately his 
proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(32). Management companies are divided into two categories: “diversified companies” and “non-
diversified companies.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b). A “diversified company” has at least seventy-five 
percent of the value of its total assets invested in “cash and cash items (including receivables), 
Government securities, securities of other investment companies, and other securities,” but no more 
than five percent of the value of the total assets of the management company can be invested in any 
one issuer and such investment cannot exceed ten percent of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities. 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1). A “non-diversified company” is “any management company other than a 
diversified company.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(2). A closed-end fund is any management investment 
company other than an open-end fund. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2). After the initial public offering, shares 
of a closed-end fund trade like shares of an operating company: they can be listed on an exchange, 
traded in the over-the-counter markets, or bought and sold in direct transactions between individuals or 
institutional investors. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF 
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 423 (1992). The corporate governance issues facing the boards 
of directors of closed-end funds are beyond the scope of this Article, as is the general topic of 
corporate governance for operating companies. 
 2. See INV. CO. INST., 2004 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 79–83 (2004). 
 3. A mutual fund that invests in shares issued by other investment companies is known as a 
“fund of funds.” See Martin E. Lybecker, Fund of Funds: The 1996 Act and Related Industry 
Developments, INVESTMENT LAW., Jan. 1997, at 33. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/5
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per share (a money market fund).4 Unlike an operating company that is 
managed by its officers and employees, most mutual funds are managed 
by an external investment adviser, pursuant to a contract. In recognition of 
the obvious conflict of interest between a mutual fund and its investment 
adviser because of or resulting from that contract, the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”)5 has always required 
that at least forty percent of the members of the mutual fund’s board of 
directors be independent.6 In July 2004, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), in a three-to-two vote,7 amended 
certain existing exemptive rules (the “Corporate Governance 
Amendments”) to require that no less than seventy-five percent of the 
members of a mutual fund’s board of directors be independent, that the 
chairman of the board of directors be an independent director, and that the 
board of directors engage in certain specific corporate governance 
practices.8 This Article will argue that the Commission’s decision to adopt 
 4. An investment company that wishes to hold itself out as a money market fund must comply 
with Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2005). See generally Martin 
E. Lybecker, Money Market Funds, in THE INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION DESKBOOK 15–1 
(Amy L. Goodman ed., 1997, rev. 1998). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52. For the legislative history of the adoption of the Investment 
Company Act, see Richard H. Farina et al., Survey, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 794–808 (1969); Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment 
Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677 (1969).  
 6. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 10(G), 54 Stat. 789, 806 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a)). Technically, the requirement is phrased in terms of no 
more than sixty percent of the members of a mutual fund’s board of directors being “interested.” The 
term “interested person” is defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-2(a)(19). Thus, a person who is not “interested” is “disinterested.” It is far more common for 
such persons to be referred to as “independent,” as they will be throughout this Article. 
 7. In the sixty-five-year history of the SEC’s administration of the Investment Company Act, 
very few decisions have been made by a three-to-two vote. See Vanguard Special Tax-Advantaged 
Retirement Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 14,361, 32 SEC Docket 1867 (Feb. 7, 
1985) (the only such prior 3–2 split on a regulatory matter). 
 8. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 83 SEC 
Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004) [hereinafter Release No. 26,520] (adopting release); Investment 
Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,323, 81 SEC Docket 3415 (Jan. 15, 
2004) (proposing release). The Corporate Governance Amendments became effective on September 7, 
2004, but compliance is not required until January 16, 2006, giving the mutual fund industry about 
sixteen months to prepare to be compliant. Release No. 26,520, supra, at 1395–96. 
 The Corporate Governance Amendments were attached to Rules 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (purchase 
of securities from an affiliated underwriter during an underwriting or selling syndicate), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.12b-1(c) (use of mutual fund assets for distribution), 17 C.F.R. § 270.15a-4(b)(2) (assignment of 
the investment advisory contract), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7(f) (purchase and sale of portfolio securities 
between affiliated persons), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-8(a)(4) (mergers between affiliated persons), 17 
C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(d)(7) (joint transactions with affiliated person), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17e-1(c) 
(brokerage transactions with affiliated person), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17g-1(j)(3) (joint fidelity bond with 
affiliated person), 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-3(e) (multiple classes of stock), and 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-
3(b)(8) (interval fund tender offers). Release No. 26,520, supra, at 1400–02. The Commission chose to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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amend these particular rules under the Investment Company Act because they address business 
situations commonly confronted by mutual funds. Id. at 1385–86. However, a mutual fund not doing 
transactions with affiliated persons, without a Rule 12b-1 Plan, with one class of stock, and with a 
dedicated fidelity bond could engage in business and not be subject to the Corporate Governance 
Amendments, rendering them elective and not mandatory for that subset of mutual funds that can 
operate successfully in that restrictive environment.  
 The Chamber of Commerce sued the SEC in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit requesting a stay of the Corporate Governance Amendments on an emergency basis, 
or, alternatively, for expedited briefing. Emergency Motion at 1, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Before filing its appeal, the Chamber of Commerce asked the 
SEC to stay the effectiveness of the Corporate Governance Amendments pending the outcome of the 
litigation, but the Commission refused on September 9, 2004, by a three-to-two vote; the Chamber of 
Commerce had previously sued the Commission on September 2, 2004, in U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia, No. 1:04-cv-01522-RMC; the U.S. District Court stayed that case pending action 
by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the Chamber of Commerce’s request for a stay 
but granted the Chamber of Commerce’s motion for expedited consideration. Judith Burns, Court 
Refuses to Delay Fund Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2004, at C19. For news accounts of arguments in 
the parties’ briefs, see Judith Burns, SEC Wants Chamber to Back off, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at 
C13; Fund Governance Rules Lawful, Rational, SEC Argues to D.C. Circuit, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 130 (Jan. 24, 2005); SEC Acted Beyond Its Powers, U.S. Chamber Urges in Fund Rule 
Challenge, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 176 (Jan. 31, 2005); see also Editorial, Mutual Displeasure, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2005, at A14 (criticizing the Corporate Governance Amendments and 
recommending a reassessment). Oral argument was held on April 15, 2005. See Judith Burns, Board 
Chairman Rule Is Challenged, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2005, at C15; Carrie Johnson, Appeals Court 
Considers Mutual Fund Rules, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2005, at E1; U.S. Chamber Argues in Appeals 
Court SEC Fund Governance Action Was Arbitrary, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 723 (Apr. 25, 
2005). 
 On June 21, 2005, the Circuit Court decided that the SEC did have the authority to adopt the 
Corporate Governance Amendments but granted the petition because the SEC had violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act by failing to consider the costs to mutual funds and at least one 
alternative approach. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 136. See also Jenny Anderson, Appeals 
Court Tells S.E.C. Director Rule Needs Review, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at C3; Court Remands 
Fund Governance Rule to SEC Based on Procedural Violations, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1097 
(June 27, 2005); Michael Schroeder et al., Court Orders SEC to Review Mutual-Fund Governance 
Rule, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2005, at A2. The Commission then promptly scheduled reconsideration of 
the Corporate Governance Amendments for June 29, 2005, the next-to-last day in Chairman 
Donaldson’s tenure at the SEC. See Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Chief Defends Timing of Fund Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2005, at C3; Riva D. Atlas, Ex-Officials Urge S.E.C. to Postpone a Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 25, 2005, at B12; Editorial, A Lawless SEC, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at A14 (criticizing the 
SEC’s decision to reconsider the Corporate Governance Amendments as “hardly the way to build trust 
with the public, Congress or the courts”); Eight Republicans on Senate Banking Panel Ask SEC to 
Defer Action on Mutual Fund Rule, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1099 (June 27, 2005); Republican 
Senators Urge SEC to Defer Action on Fund Rule, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2005, at C13; SEC 
Reconsideration of Fund Rule Should Wait, Scalia, Grundfest Urge, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1100 (June 27, 2005); Deborah Solomon, Donaldson’s Finale Draws Uproar, WALL ST. J., June 28, 
2005, at C3. 
 The SEC did reconsider the Corporate Governance Rules on June 29, 2005. Investment Company 
Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (June 30, 2005). See 
Jenny Anderson, Strife Aplenty at S.E.C. Chief’s Farewell Session, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at C3; 
Ronald A. Cass & Henry G. Manne, Op-Ed, SEC à la Donaldson, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2005, at A8 
(criticizing the SEC’s reconsideration of the Corporate Governance Amendments); Karen Damato & 
Arden Dale, Independents May Be Here to Stay, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2005, at C17 (speculating that 
mutual fund boards that have already selected an independent chairman will not switch back); Carrie 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/5
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Johnson, Records and Rancor, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at D1; Over Strenuous Dissents, SEC Acts 
to Re-Adopt Controversial Fund Rule, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1141 (July 4, 2005); Michael 
Schroeder, SEC Adopts Mutual Fund Rule, Risks New Court Challenge, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at 
C1. 
 On July 7, 2005, the Chamber of Commerce again petitioned the Court of Appeals for a 
permanent injunction. See Judith Burns, Independence Rule for Mutual Funds Faces New Protest, 
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2005, at C3; Business Group Renews Challenge to S.E.C. Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 
8, 2005, at C3; Carrie Johnson, Chamber Again Sues SEC over Fund Rule, WASH. POST, July 8, 2005, 
at D2; U.S. Chamber Sues SEC Second Time over Mutual Fund Rule, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
1170 (July 11, 2005). Simultaneously, the Chamber of Commerce sought reconsideration of that part 
of the Court of Appeals’s June 21st ruling that the Commission had adequately justified the need for 
the independent chair and seventy-five percent independence requirement, but that petition was 
denied. Court Denies Chamber’s Petition for Rehearing in Fund Governance Case, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1521 (Sept. 19, 2005). On August 10th, the Court of Appeals granted the Chamber of 
Commerce’s motion for a stay. See Appeals Court Stays Requirements of SEC Mutual Fund 
Governance Rule, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA) 1357 (Aug. 15, 2005); Judith Burns, Fund-Board 
Rule Is Dealt Setback, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2005, at C11; Judith Burns, SEC Response, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 9, 2005, at C13; By 2–2 Vote, SEC Refuses to Stay Fund Governance Rules Pending Decision, 37 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1249 (July 25, 2005); Chamber Seeks Court Stay of SEC Fund Rules 
Pending Decision, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1279 (Aug. 1, 2005); Editorial, Donaldson’s Dead 
Hand, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2005, at A12 (criticizing delegation of authority to defend lawsuit to SEC 
General Counsel, thereby avoiding further involvement by individual SEC Commissioners); U.S. 
Chamber Asks SEC to Stay Rule on Fund Governance Pending Court Decision, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1213 (July 18, 2005). For news accounts of the briefs, see Judith Burns, SEC’s Fund-Rule 
Fight Continues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2005, at C13; Mutual Fund Rules Consistent with ’40 Act, APA, 
SEC Tells D.C. Cir., 37 SEC Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1797 (Oct. 31, 2005); U.S. Chamber Says SEC 
Violated Law in Re-Adopting Two Mutual Fund Provisions, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1580 
(Sept. 26, 2005). On November 11, 2005, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins spoke to the American Bar 
Association’s Committee on Banking Law and criticized the process by which the Corporate 
Governance Amendments were re-approved and the manner in which the Commission’s Office of 
General Counsel was handling the appeal. Paul S. Atkins, SEC Commissioner, Remarks Before the 
American Bar Association Legislative and Regulatory Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking 
Law, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111105psa.htm; Judith Burns, Fight over an SEC Rule 
Intensifies, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2005, at C13. 
 Additionally, Congress required the SEC to submit a report by May 1, 2005, to the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate that provided a justification for the independent chairman requirement of 
the Corporate Governance Amendments, including an analysis of “whether mutual funds chaired by 
independent directors perform better, have lower expenses, or have better compliance records than 
mutual funds chaired by interested directors.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 
108-447, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (118 Stat. 2809, 2910). See STAFF OF THE SEC, EXEMPTIVE RULE 
AMENDMENTS OF 2004: THE INDEPENDENT CHAIR CONDITION (2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/indchair.pdf (the required report); see also Judith Burns, SEC Fumbles on Defense of Ruling, 
WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at C17 (describing disagreement among the five Commissioners about 
whether the report did what Congress asked the SEC to do); Glassman, Atkins Dissent on SEC Study of 
Independent Chair Rule for Mutual Funds, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 813 (May 9, 2005) 
(describing letter sent to Senator Cochran, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, by the 
dissenters, stating that the report “fails to respond constructively to your inquiry and offers no 
evidence to support its premises”). The Commission is directed to act upon the recommendations of 
the report not later than January 1, 2006, fifteen days before the Corporate Governance Amendments 
were to have become effective. 118 Stat. at 2910. 
 Finally, some have pragmatically proceeded to take steps to implement the Corporate Governance 
Amendments in light of the compliance deadline of January 16, 2006. See INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL, 
BOARD SELF-ASSESSMENTS: SEEKING TO IMPROVE MUTUAL FUND BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 4–16 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Corporate Governance Amendments was without statutory authority 
and usurped the proper legislative role of Congress, was not adequately 
justified, and will be of questionable efficacy.9  
I. THE EVOLVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR MUTUAL FUNDS 
A. The Investment Company Act as a Baseline for Comparison 
The original Senate bill that would ultimately become the Investment 
Company Act would have required that a majority of the members of a 
mutual fund’s board of directors be independent.10 However, Congress 
ultimately provided that forty percent of the members of a mutual fund’s 
board of directors be independent.11 Congress believed that investors 
(2005), http://memos.ici.org.intradoe/groups/attachments/documents/attachment/18543.pdf (identifying 
the process for self-assessment as embracing: composition of the board; board committees; board 
meetings; meeting materials; oversight of multiple funds; director compensation; overall assessment of 
the board; and self-assessment of individual directors); INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTING THE 
INDEPENDENT CHAIRPERSON REQUIREMENT 4–7 (2005), http://memos.ici.org/ getPDF.do?file=18424 
(identifying the duties and responsibilities of an independent chair as including: managing the board 
meeting and setting the agenda; coordinating communication with the investment adviser and others; 
managing board operations; guiding the investment advisory contract renewal process; and managing 
the board’s self-assessment process); Arden Dale, Fund Boards Get Set for Self-Reviews, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 14, 2005, at C15 (describing practical considerations being considered by the Independent 
Directors Council in evaluating methodologies for self-assessments); Arden Dale, Independent 
Chairmen Move into Place, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at R1 (describing decisions by different boards 
of trustees to proceed or to wait in selecting independent chairpersons); SEC Mutual Fund Governance 
Rule Not Costly, Directors Group Reports, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1483 (Sept. 5, 2005). 
 9. The Commission has been criticized for the lack of empirical data supporting rules that it has 
recently adopted. PETER WALLISON, AM. ENTER. INST., SHOOTING FROM THE HIP: THE SEC HAS 
STOPPED DOING ITS HOMEWORK 1, Oct. 1, 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040922_Financial 
ServicesCCG.pdf. 
Throughout its seventy-year history, the Securities and Exchange Commission has always 
distinguished itself among regulatory agencies by the care and thoroughness with which it 
approached the issues within its jurisdiction. Major initiatives and even relatively modest 
reform measures were often preceded by extensive staff studies or reports from advisory 
committees of distinguished members of the securities industry or the securities bar. . . . Thus, 
it has been surprising and disappointing that in the last year, for reasons that are not yet clear, 
the SEC has abandoned its customary mode of operation and begun to propose major changes 
in its rules and regulations that are not apparently based on any empirical work by the 
[C]ommission’s staff or any significant reliance on academic or other outside studies. As a 
result, the [C]ommission’s recent initiatives have seemed ad hoc and superficial—indeed, 
almost ideologically driven—and as a result have drawn far more opposition from inside and 
outside the securities industry and within the [C]ommission itself than has historically been 
true of SEC rulemaking. 
Id. 
 10. S. 3580, 76th Cong. § 10(a) (1940). 
 11. See supra note 6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/5
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would prefer to choose mutual funds that they knew would be guided 
principally by individuals affiliated with the mutual fund’s investment 
adviser: 
 The bill as originally introduced . . . required that a majority of 
the board be independent of the management. However, the 
argument was made that it is difficult for a person or firm to 
undertake the management of an investment company, [and] give 
advice, when the majority of the board may repudiate that advice. It 
was urged that if a person is buying management of a particular 
person and if the majority of the board can repudiate his advice, 
then in effect, you are depriving the stockholders of that person’s 
advice.  
 . . . [T]hat is why the provision for 40 percent of independents 
was inserted.12 
Importantly, Congress also simultaneously provided different formulas 
regarding membership on a mutual fund’s board of directors to address 
different situations:  
• A majority of the members may not be affiliated persons of a 
regular broker, underwriter, or investment banker employed by 
the mutual fund, or persons with which such regular broker, 
underwriter, or investment banker is an affiliated person;13 
• A majority of the members may not be persons who are officers, 
directors, or employees of any bank;14 and 
• Only one independent director is necessary if, among other 
requirements, the mutual fund is no-load, its investment 
adviser’s fee does not exceed one percent of assets under 
management, and the mutual fund has only one class of 
securities outstanding.15 
 12. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearing on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of 
the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 109–110 (1940) [hereinafter Hearings 
on H.R. 10065] (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel of the Commission’s Investment Trust 
Study). 
 13. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 10(b), 54 Stat. 789, 806 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b)). See Hearings on H.R. 10065, supra note 12, at 110 (testimony of 
David Schenker) (need for majority of independent directors where there is a pecuniary interest more 
direct than that of an investment adviser earning a fee).  
 14. Investment Company Act § 10(c). 
 15. Investment Company Act § 10(d). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The point is that even in 1940 Congress had definite, nuanced ideas 
about the composition of a mutual fund’s board of directors. It also bears 
emphasis that Congress did not in 1940 elect to legislate about any other 
matter of corporate governance, with the result that mutual funds have 
always looked to corporate law in the jurisdiction in which they are 
organized to determine all kinds of routine corporate matters.16  
B. The 1970 Amendments Act 
In 1970, new section 2(a)(19) was added to the Investment Company 
Act and section 15(c) was amended by the Investment Company 
Amendments Act of 1970 (“1970 Amendments Act”).17 Section 15(c) 
provides that: 
[(1)] [I]t shall be unlawful for any [mutual fund] having a board of 
directors to enter into, renew, or perform any contract or agreement, 
written or oral, whereby a person undertakes regularly to serve or 
act as investment adviser of or principal underwriter for such 
[mutual fund], unless the terms of such contract or agreement and 
any renewal thereof have been approved by the vote of a majority of 
directors, who are not parties to such contract or agreement or 
interested persons of any such party, cast in person at a meeting 
called for the purpose of voting on such approval. [(2)] It shall be 
the duty of the directors of a [mutual fund] to request and evaluate, 
and the duty of an investment adviser to such [mutual fund] to 
furnish, such information as may reasonably be necessary to 
 16. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478–79 (1979) (holding that federal courts should apply state 
law governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits to the extent such 
law is consistent with the Investment Company Act; the Investment Company Act does not purport to 
be the source of authority for managerial power—rather, it functions primarily to impose controls and 
restrictions on the internal management of mutual funds).  
 It should be noted that section 16(a) of the Investment Company Act prohibits a person from 
serving as a director of a mutual fund unless he has been elected to that office by the shareholders of 
the mutual fund. Section 16(a) goes on to provide that vacancies “may be filled in any otherwise legal 
manner if immediately after filling any such vacancy at least two-thirds of the directors then holding 
office shall have been elected to such office” by the shareholders of the mutual fund at an annual or 
special meeting. Properly viewed, section 16(a) merely indicates when an election of directors must 
take place—indeed, the two-thirds requirement is agnostic as to whether the remaining directors are 
interested or independent. See John Nuveen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter [1986–1987 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,383, at 77,201–02 (Nov. 18, 1986) (stating that section 16(a) 
does not require mutual funds to hold shareholders’ meetings annually to elect directors).  
 17. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, §§ 2(a)(3), 8(c), 84 
Stat. 1413, 1413–14, 1420 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), -15(c)). Section 2(a)(19) was 
subsequently amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. See infra note 23. 
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evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a person undertakes 
regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of such [mutual 
fund].18 
The purpose of section 15(c) was to empower the independent 
members of the board of directors of a mutual fund (1) by requiring that 
the investment advisory contract be approved by a majority of independent 
directors at an in-person meeting, and (2) by giving them the statutory 
authority to demand information and to impose on the investment adviser 
the obligation to provide it.19 It is notable that the congressional draftsmen 
of section 15(c) chose to empower all of the directors of a mutual fund, 
not just those who are independent, suggesting that an interested director 
of a mutual fund has the same fiduciary obligations as an independent 
director of a mutual fund with respect to review and approval of the 
mutual fund’s investment advisory contract.20 
Section (2)(a)(19) was inserted by the 1970 Amendments Act to 
provide that: 
“Interested person” of another person means— 
(A) when used with respect to an investment company— 
 (i) any affiliated person of such company, 
 (ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural person 
who is an affiliated person of such company, 
 (iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or 
principal underwriter for such company, 
 (iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any 
time since the beginning of the last two completed fiscal years of 
such company has acted as legal counsel for such company, 
 (v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 or any affiliated person of such a broker or dealer, and  
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000). 
 19. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1382, at 26 (1970). See William J. Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund 
Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1971) (discussing the sources and scope of 
independent directors responsibilities). For a pre-1970 Amendments Act discussion of the factors that 
independent directors ought to consider to fulfill properly their role, see Robert H. Mundheim, Some 
Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1058 (1967). 
 20. It should be noted that section 36(a)(1), which imposes a federal fiduciary duty upon the 
“directors” of a mutual fund, also does not distinguish between an interested and independent director 
in imposing that duty. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a)(1) (2000).  
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 (vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall 
have determined to be an interested person by reason of having had, 
at any time since the beginning of the last two completed fiscal 
years of such company, a material business or professional 
relationship with such company or with the principal executive 
officer of such company or with any other investment company 
having the same investment adviser or principal underwriter or with 
the principal executive officer of such other investment company: 
 Provided, That no person shall be deemed to be an interested 
person of an investment company solely by reason of (aa) his being 
a member of its board of directors or advisory board or an owner of 
its securities, or (bb) his membership in the immediate family of 
any person specified in clause (aa) of this proviso . . . .”21  
Section 2(a)(19) casts a very wide net, precluding virtually anyone with 
a business or professional relationship with the mutual fund or its 
investment adviser22 from serving as an independent director of the mutual 
fund. 
Section 2(a)(19) was amended in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act by striking old clause (v), adding new clauses (v) and (vi), and 
renumbering old clause (vi) to become clause (vii).23 New clauses (v) and 
(vi) add to the term “interested person” a person who at any time within 
the six-month period preceding the date of the determination “has 
executed portfolio transactions for, engaged in any principal transactions 
with, or distributed shares for” the investment company, and a person who 
at any time within the six-month period preceding the date of the 
determination has loaned money or other property to the investment 
company.24 The purpose of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act amendments was 
to reflect the fact that a broker-dealer or bank could serve as an investment 
adviser to a mutual fund and disallow persons who were affiliated with a 
broker-dealer or bank otherwise doing business with a mutual fund from 
serving as an independent director of that mutual fund.25  
 21. § 2(a)(3). 
 22. Section 2(a)(19)(B) defines the term “interested person” with respect to an investment 
adviser or principal underwriter of a mutual fund in a manner that is almost identical to subparagraph 
(A), adding any person who has any direct or indirect beneficial interest in “any security issued either 
by such investment adviser or principal underwriter, or by controlling person o[f] such investment 
adviser or principal underwriter.” Id. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 213, 113 Stat. 1338, 1397–98 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(19)).  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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C. The 1975 Amendments Act 
In 1975, new section 15(f) was added to the Investment Company Act 
by the Securities Acts Amendments Act of 1975 (“1975 Amendments 
Act”).26 Section 15(f)(1) provides: 
An investment adviser . . . of a [mutual fund] or an affiliated person 
of such investment adviser . . . may receive any amount or benefit in 
connection with a sale of securities of, or a sale of any other interest 
in, such investment adviser . . . which results in an assignment of an 
investment advisory contract with such [mutual fund] . . . if— 
 (A) for a period of three years after the time of such action, at 
least 75 per centum of the members of the board of directors of such 
[mutual fund] . . . are not (i) interested persons of the investment 
adviser of such [mutual fund] . . . , or (ii) interested persons of the 
predecessor investment adviser . . . ; and  
 (B) There is not imposed an unfair unburden on such [mutual 
fund] as a result of such transaction or any express or implied terms, 
conditions, or understand applicable thereto.”27 
Section 15(f) was adopted by Congress in response to the decision of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rosenfeld v. Black.28 
In Rosenfeld, the court ruled that an investment adviser to a closed-end 
fund that sold its investment advisory contract to a third-party—which 
would succeed it as investment adviser to the closed-end fund—had 
breached its fiduciary duty to the closed-end fund. Specifically, the 
investment advisory contract with the closed-end fund was an asset of the 
closed-end fund (and not of the investment adviser) that the investment 
adviser could not lawfully sell.29 There was a strong reaction to the 
Rosenfeld decision for, if applied literally to investment advisers to mutual 
funds, it would deprive them of one traditional avenue of capturing the 
value of the business that had been built up over the years by selling the 
stock of the investment adviser to a successor investment adviser. Section 
15(f) resolved the uncertainty caused by the Rosenfeld decision by 
allowing the sale of the investment advisory contract while adding two 
 26. Securities Acts Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 28(1), 89 Stat. 97, 164.  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f)(1) (2000). Subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of § 15(f) provide 
definitions of interested person and unfair burden, and descriptions of transactions to which § 15(f)(1) 
should not apply. 15 U.S.C. § 20a-15(f)(2)-(4). 
 28. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 71 (1975). 
 29. Rosenfeld, 445 F.2d at 1342–44. 
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principal safeguards to protect a mutual fund and its shareholders—the 
requirement that seventy-five percent of the members of the board of 
directors be independent for at least three years, and the requirement that 
the transaction not impose any unfair burden on the investment company.  
D. Rule 12b-1 in 1980 
Rule 12b-130 was adopted in 1980 after a long period of consideration 
by the Commission regarding whether assets of mutual funds should be 
used to make payments to selling dealers to supplement the process of 
distributing shares of mutual funds.31 Before the mid-1970s, most mutual 
funds were sold with a sales load or were “no-load,” and the sponsor 
and/or principal underwriter and/or investment adviser to the mutual fund 
bore the cost of distributing shares of the no-load mutual fund.32 It was the 
advent of money market funds and the introduction of broker-dealer-
sponsored “cash management accounts” in the mid-1970s that caused 
concern regarding the process of distribution.33 Shares of a money market 
fund, offering a stable net asset value of $1.00 with a return based on its 
portfolio of high-quality, short-term debt securities, could scarcely be sold 
with a sales load (although the very earliest versions were sold with a low-
load); a brokerage account with “sweep” capability, daily redemptions, 
wire transfers, and check-writing privileges (providing the functionality of 
a bank time deposit offering an interest rate that varies daily with the 
money markets), could not bear the costs of sales loads on daily 
transactions.34  
After strongly resisting the idea of allowing a mutual fund’s assets to 
be used to pay for the distribution of its shares,35 the SEC ultimately 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005). 
 31. Section 12(b) of the Investment Company Act provides that it is unlawful for a mutual fund 
“to act as a distributor of securities of which it is the issuer, except through an underwriter, in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(b). 
The permissive aspect of § 12(b) was not self-executing, so it required the adoption of something like 
Rule 12b-1 for mutual funds to act as their own underwriters and use fund assets for distribution. The 
SEC took the position that the prohibition in § 12(b), however, proscribed any payments that a mutual 
fund might make, even indirectly through an investment advisory fee, for example, that would have 
the effect of paying for the costs of distribution. Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, 
Securities Act Release No. 6254, Investment Company Act Release No. 11,414, 21 SEC Docket 324 
(Oct. 28, 1980). 
 32. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-
2337, at 51–52 (1966). 
 33. See infra notes 35–36. 
 34. Lybecker, supra note 4, at 15-3 to 15-4. 
 35. See Future Structure of the Securities Markets, [Extra Edition] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 
409, 35–49 (Feb. 4, 1972) (SEC policy statement that any use of a mutual fund’s assets for the purpose 
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decided to adopt Rule 12b-1 to allow such payments when subject to 
annual review and approval by the mutual fund’s board of directors.36 For 
this purpose, paragraph (c) of Rule 12b-1 as adopted in 1980 allowed a 
mutual fund to rely on Rule 12b-1 only if a majority of the members of the 
mutual fund’s board of directors were independent and they selected and 
nominated all new independent members of the mutual fund’s board of 
directors.37 Interestingly, much of the adopting release is devoted to 
arguments that the Commission had the statutory authority in section 12(b) 
to regulate the use of fund assets to pay for distribution, and that it was 
proper to include indirect distribution expenses within Rule 12b-1 so that 
all distribution expenses knowingly financed by a mutual fund’s board of 
of financing the distribution of mutual fund shares would be improper); see also National Aviation & 
Technology Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1979–1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 82,414, at 82,729 (Feb. 16, 1979) (permitting a fund to bear distribution costs temporarily where it 
was in the process of converting from a closed-end fund to an open-end fund under pressure of heavy 
redemptions from arbitrageurs); Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 9915, 12 SEC Docket 1657, 1657 (Sept. 1, 1977) (order reiterating the 
Commission’s 1972 position, establishing a hearing for all pending exemptive applications seeking to 
use fund assets to pay for distribution, and instructing the SEC staff not to issue any no-action letters 
with respect to any “new” proposed distribution arrangements); Mutual Liquid Assets, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1976–1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,667, at 86,730 (July 15, 
1976) (permitting a proposed arrangement where the money market fund would allocate fifty percent 
of its investment advisory fees to the distributor, subsequently withdrawn at the Commission’s 
direction in October 1976); Pegasus Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 SEC No-Act LEXIS 
1117, at *1 (May 22, 1975) (permitting an internally-managed mutual fund to bear distribution 
expenses where the members of the board of directors and legal counsel were serving pursuant to a 
court order); Broad Street Investing Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. 7114, 1972 SEC 
LEXIS 534 (Apr. 14, 1972) (exemptive order permitting a mutual fund complex with a captive 
underwriter to share the costs of distribution expenses); Broad Street Investing Corp., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 7072, 972 LEXIS 1251 (Mar. 16, 1972) (notice). For the complete history 
of the quest by the Vanguard Group to bear its own distribution expenses, see Vanguard Group, Inc., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 11,761, 22 SEC Docket 988 (May 4, 1981) (order); Vanguard 
Group, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 11,718, 22 SEC Docket 728 (Apr. 6, 1981) (notice 
of filing of application for an exemptive order permitting proposed transactions); Vanguard Group, 
Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 11,645, 22 SEC Docket 238, 238 (Feb. 25, 1981) (decision 
of the Commission approving plan and granting exemption); Vanguard Group, Inc., 1979 SEC LEXIS 
2452 (Oct. 4, 1979) (supplemental initial decision of the administrative law judge); Vanguard Group, 
Inc., 1978 SEC LEXIS 2550 (Nov. 29, 1978) (initial decision of administrative law judge); Vanguard 
Group, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 10,016, 13 SEC Docket 903 (Nov. 18, 1977) (order 
setting the matter down for an administrative hearing); Vanguard Group Inc., Investment Company 
Act Release No. 9927, 13 SEC Docket 92 (Sept. 13, 1977); Vanguard Group, Inc., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 9850, 12 SEC Docket 1301 (July 15, 1977) (notice of filing of application 
for exemption permitting mutual fund complex to bear distribution expenses). 
 36. Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 6254, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 11,414, 21 SEC Docket 324 (Oct. 23, 1980) (adoption of Rules 
12b-1 and 17d-3); Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 
6119, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,862, 18 SEC Docket 271 (Sept. 7, 1979) (proposed 
Rules 12b-1 and 17d-3).  
 37. 21 SEC Docket at 337. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1045 Lybecker book pages.doc4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1058 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1045 
 
 
 
 
 
 
directors would fall within the ambit of Rule 12b-1.38 The SEC’s final 
position was that where an investment adviser bears distribution expenses 
out of its own resources, the investment advisory fee must not be a conduit 
for the indirect use of fund assets. In other words, if the investment 
advisory fee is not “excessive” within the meaning of Section 36(b) (i.e., 
they are “legitimate profits”), the distribution expenses may be borne by 
the investment adviser because they are not an indirect use of a mutual 
fund’s assets.39  
E. “Protecting Investors”—The Special Study in 1992 
In 1992, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management issued its 
important study, Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment 
Company Regulation.40 Regarding investment company governance, the 
Division concluded: 
the governance model embodied in the [Investment Company] Act 
is sound and should be retained, with limited modifications. The 
oversight function performed by [mutual fund] boards of directors, 
especially the “watchdog” function performed by the independent 
directors, has served investors well, at minimal cost. In our view, 
however, the increasingly significant responsibilities placed on 
independent directors warrant a few changes to further strengthen 
their independence. Accordingly, the Division recommends that the 
Commission recommend legislation that would increase the 
minimum proportion of independent directors on [mutual fund] 
boards from forty percent to more than fifty percent. In addition, the 
Division recommends that independent director vacancies be filled 
by persons chosen by remaining independent directors. Finally, the 
Division proposes that independent directors be given the express 
authority to terminate advisory contracts. 
 At the same time, however, the Division recommends 
eliminating provisions in certain rules under the [Investment 
Company] Act that make independent directors responsible for 
detailed findings of fact or for reviews and findings that involve 
more ritual than substance. Elimination of such formalistic 
 38. Id. at 331–35. 
 39. Id. at 333. 
 40. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT 
COMPANY REGULATION (1992). 
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requirements will increase the effectiveness of boards of directors 
by allowing them to focus to a greater extent on what they do best—
exercising business judgment in their review of interested party 
transactions and in their oversight of operational matters where the 
interests of a[] [mutual fund] and its adviser may diverge.41  
The recommendations from this important study are striking in at least 
two respects: (i) the Division expected Congress (and not the Commission 
through rulemaking) to effect any change in the minimum percent of 
members on a mutual fund’s board of directors who must be 
independent;42 and (ii) the Division believed that the highest and best use 
of independent directors was to review interested party transactions and 
other matters where the interests of the mutual fund and its adviser might 
diverge.43 
F. The 2001 Amendments 
In 1999, the Commission convened a two-day public Roundtable on 
the Role of Independent Investment Company Directors to discuss the role 
of independent directors and the steps that could be taken to improve their 
effectiveness.44 Based on this discussion, the Commission proposed that 
independent directors constitute a majority of the board of directors of a 
mutual fund relying on certain exemptive rules,45 that legal counsel to 
independent directors be independent,46 and that independent directors 
 41. Id. at 253–54. 
 42. Id. at 266–67 (recommending legislation to increase the forty percent independent director 
requirement). 
 43. Id. at 266. 
 44. See SEC, THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS (1999), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/roundtable/iicdrndt1.htm; http://www.sec.gov/divisions/invest
ment/roundtable/iicdrndt2.htm (transcripts from roundtable of independent directors, investor 
advocates, executives of mutual fund advisers, academicians, corporate governance experts, and legal 
counsel). 
 45. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7754, 
Exchange Act Release No. 42,007, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,082, 70 SEC Docket 
1867 (Oct. 14, 1999) (proposing release). 
 46. It seems gratuitous and self-serving to criticize rules that require lawyers to be 
“independent.” In this rulemaking, however, the Commission did not link any specific abuses or 
abusive situations involving lawyers who were not independent to the need to adopt the proposal. 
Instead, the SEC based its proposal on its perception of the dynamics of the boardroom and its 
assumptions about the need for independent directors to have independent legal counsel, presumably 
to offset the undue influence of the investment adviser and its legal counsel in the boardroom. Role of 
Independent Directors of Investment Companies, id. at 1878–79 (proposing release). It is at least ironic 
that the Commission is confident that independent directors will make good decisions when faced with 
a conflict of interest, but cannot be trusted to (i) select their own legal counsel or (ii) select and appoint 
the chairman of the board of directors on which they sit.  
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nominate and select new independent directors.47 With respect to the 
requirement that independent directors have “independent legal counsel,” 
if they have any counsel at all, Rule 0-1(a)(6)(i) under the Investment 
Company Act provides that a person is “independent legal counsel” with 
respect to the independent directors of a mutual fund if:  
(A) A majority of the [independent] directors reasonably determine 
in the exercise of their judgment (and record the basis for that 
determination in the minutes of their meeting) that any 
representation by the person of the [mutual fund]’s investment 
adviser, principal underwriter, administrator (“management 
organizations”), or any of their control persons, since the beginning 
of the fund’s last two completed fiscal years, is or was sufficiently 
limited that it is unlikely to adversely affect the professional 
judgment of the person in providing legal representation to the 
[independent] directors; and 
 (B) The [independent] directors have obtained an undertaking 
from such person to provide them with information necessary to 
make their determination and to update promptly that information 
when the person begins to represent, or materially increases his 
representation of, a management organization or control person.48  
In January 2001, the Commission adopted the 2001 Amendments.49 
The 2001 Amendments were just as extralegal as the Corporate 
Governance Amendments are, but were neither as controversial nor as 
intrusive because (a) many mutual funds had adopted Plans pursuant to 
Rule 12b-1 and thus at least fifty percent of the members of the board of 
directors were already independent, and (b) most independent directors 
 47. Id. at 1871–72. 
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)(i) (2005). Subparagraph (ii) of Rule 0-1(a)(6) permits the 
independent directors “to rely on the information obtained from the person, unless they know or have 
reason to believe that the information is materially false or incomplete. The disinterested directors 
must re-evaluate their determination no less frequently than annually (and record the basis 
accordingly). . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)(ii) (2005). Subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) provide a 
transition period if independent legal counsel loses his “independence” and define terms for purposes 
of paragraph (a). 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)(iii), (iv) (2005).  
 49. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies; Correction, Securities Act Release 
No. 7932 Exchange Act Release No. 43,786A, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816A, 74 
SEC Docket 473 (Feb. 27, 2001); Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities 
Act Release No. 7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release No. 24, 
816, 74 SEC Docket 3 (Jan. 2, 2001) (adopting release).  
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were already represented by legal counsel who were independent in that 
they did not also represent the mutual fund’s investment adviser.50 
II. THE SCANDALS FROM 2003–2004 
A. Market-Timing51 
On September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General announced a 
civil injunctive action against Canary Capital Partners LLC (“Canary 
Capital”) in which Canary Capital agreed to pay $40 million to settle 
claims against it under the Martin Act.52 The Canary Capital complaint 
described four mutual fund groups that had cooperated with Canary 
Capital by, inter alia, allegedly allowing it to effect market-timing and 
“late-trading” transactions in shares of certain mutual funds in return for 
“sticky assets” (usually invested in a private hedge fund also managed by 
the investment adviser); allegedly, one of the investment advisers 
effectively functioned as Canary Capital’s prime broker, lent it money, 
allowed a terminal to be installed in Canary Capital’s offices to facilitate 
late trading in shares of mutual funds, and disclosed portfolio holdings to, 
 50. Cf. INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR FUND 
DIRECTORS 18–20 (1999). 
 51. See generally GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND TRADING ABUSES: LESSONS 
CAN BE LEARNED FROM SEC NOT HAVING DETECTED VIOLATIONS AT AN EARLIER STAGE (2005) 
(report to the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives discussing the SEC’s immediate 
and subsequent response to the market timing abuses). Cf. GOV. ACCOUNTABLITY OFFICE, MUTUAL 
FUND TRADING ABUSES: SEC CONSISTENTLY APPLIED PROCEDURES IN SETTING PENALTIES, BUT 
COULD STRENGTHEN CERTAIN INTERNAL CONTROLS (2005); Enforcement Chief Says Big Board to 
Complete Fund Probe by Year’s End, 84 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1125 (June 27, 2005) (regulatory 
bodies plan to conclude current investigations into market-timing and late-trading of mutual funds by 
the end of 2005). 
 52. Press Release, N.Y. Att’y General, State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 
2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html (reporting a disgorgement penalty 
of $30 million and civil money penalty of $10 million). It is remarkable that neither the New York 
Attorney General nor the Department of Justice have yet brought criminal charges against Canary 
Capital or any of its principals under state or federal laws. Cf. State ex rel. McGraw v. Bear Stearns & 
Co., 618 S.E.2d 582, 584 (W. Va. 2005) (decision on a certified question from the Circuit Court of 
Marshall County that the West Virginia consumer protection statutes do not provide a basis for an 
action against securities underwriters for manipulating the product of associated research analysts). It 
is also remarkable that so many investment advisers and broker-dealers have acceded to the New York 
Attorney General’s assertion of jurisdiction of the Martin Act to activities that are clearly regulated in 
detail by the SEC. But see Complaint, J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 CV 7781 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 6, 2005) (asserting lack of jurisdiction of the state to address advisory fees); Riva D. Atlas, Firm 
Sues to Block Mutual Fund Fee Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at C8 (reporting suit); Erica 
Copulsky, Money Manager Sues Eliot Spitzer, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2005, at C13; Erica Copulsky, 
Seligman Again Draws Spitzer’s Fire, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2005, at C13; Editorial, Spitzer in Court, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2005, at A16 (giving kudos to J & W. Seligman & Co. for challenging the New 
York Attorney General for exceeding his powers). 
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and designed derivative instruments for, Canary Capital to permit it to 
consummate more efficient hedging transactions based on the non-public 
information about the mutual fund’s investment portfolio.53  
 53. Administrative Proceedings Instituted Against Theodore Charles Sihpol, III, a Former Broker 
at Banc of America Securities LLC, for Enabling Certain Hedge Fund Customers to “Late-Trade” 
Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8288, Exchange Act Release No. 48,493, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,179, 81 SEC Docket 17 (Sept. 16, 2003). The New York Attorney 
General simultaneously brought criminal charges against Mr. Sihpol in New York State Court. Riva D. 
Atlas, Spitzer’s Office Prepares for Rare Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at C1; Broker’s Trial 
Hears Testimony on Late Trading, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2005, at B2; Judith Burns, Charges Stand, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2005, at C15 (trial court refused to dismiss the charges); Arden Dale, Fund 
Trustees Testify in Sihpol Case, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2005, at C15; Arden Dale, Jury Hears About 
Timestamp Deceit, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2005, at C15; Arden Dale, Late-Trade Case Prosecution 
Rests, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2005, at C13; Arden Dale, Sihpol Never Talked About Trades, WALL ST. 
J., May 12, 2005, at C17; Arden Dale, Sihpol’s Attorneys Rest Their Case, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005, 
at C15; Arden Dale, Witness Bolsters Sihpol’s Defense, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2005, at C15; Arden 
Dale, Witness Calls Fund Trades No Secret, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2005, at C13; Arden Dale, Witness 
Details Sihpol Arrangement, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2005, at C13; Arden Dale, Witness Testifies at 
Sihpol’s Trial, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2005, at C15; Jonathan D. Glater, For Some, “Just Following 
Orders” Is a Good Defense, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at C6 (commentary that prosecuting low-level 
employees can be difficult); Jurors in Sihpol Case Divided on 13 Counts, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2005, 
at C15; Brooke A. Masters, Spitzer’s Charges Face a Challenge, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, at E1; 
Op-Ed, The Sihpol Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2005, at A8 (criticizing Spitzer for bringing case); 
Angelo Pruitt, Sihpol’s Supervisor Testifies at Trial, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2005, at C19; Kara Scanell 
& Arden Dale, After-Hours Trading Goes on Trial, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2005, at C17; Kara Scannell 
& Arden Dale, Sihpol Verdict Raises Questions on Spitzer Style, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2005, at A1; 
Sihpol Absolved of Most Charges in N.Y. Suit over Mutual Fund Trading, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1039 (June 13, 2005); Sihpol Jury to Begin Deliberations Today, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at 
C13; Trial Will Proceed for Former Broker, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at C6; Verdict on Some 
Counts in Broker’s Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at C2. 
 The New York Attorney General initially decided to retry Mr. Sihpol on the four counts on which 
the jury could not agree. See Arden Dale, Spitzer Plans to Retry Sihpol on 4 Counts in Fund-Trade 
Case, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2005, at C3; Editorial, Cruel and Unusual, WALL. ST. J., July 11, 2005, at 
A12 (criticizing the decision to retry Mr. Sihpol as “vindictive and petty”); Jonathan D. Glater, Case 
Isn’t Closed as Spitzer’s Office Plans to Retry Broker on 4 Counts, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at C3; 
Sihpol Retrial Postponed Until October, IGNITES, Aug. 12, 2005, http://www.ignites.com/ome/ 
members/article.html?id=974227046; Spitzer Offers Ex-Broker Alternative to Retrial, WASH. POST, 
July 8, 2005, at D2. See also Possible Sihpol Retrial Talks to Start Oct. 20, IGNITES, Oct. 10, 2005, 
http://www.ignites.com/articles/20051010/possible_sihpol_retrial_talks_start; Sources: Sihpol About 
to Settle with SEC, IGNITES, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.ignites.com/articles/20051012/ 
sources_sihpol_about_settle_with; Riva D. Atlas & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Broker Is Said to be 
Close to Deal with the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at C3; SEC Press Release No. 2005-146, 
SEC Settles Securities Fraud Charges Against Theodore Sihpol, Oct. 12, 2005; Arden Dale & Chad 
Bray, Spitzer Won’t Retry Sihpol on Trading Charges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2005, at C5; N.Y. 
Criminal Charges Against Sihpol Dismissed, as Broker Settles with SEC, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1729 (Oct. 17, 2005). In the matter of Theodore Charles Sihpol III, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2440 (Oct. 12, 2005) (order barring association with any broker, dealer, or investment 
adviser for five years, and announcing payment of $200,000 as a civil money penalty to resolve the 
SEC’s civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York). 
 For other criminal cases against individuals at brokerage firms who facilitated market-timing 
activities, see Chad Bray, Guilty Pleas, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2005, at C13 (senior executives of 
Security Trust); Broker Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2005, at C13; Former Trader Pleads 
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Mutual funds are required by Rule 22c-1 under the Investment 
Company Act to effect transactions in their shares at the current net asset 
value per share (“NAV”) next determined after receipt of the request for 
redemption or order to purchase.54 Most mutual funds calculate their NAV 
at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time, so orders received after 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time 
today should be effected at the price next determined, i.e., the NAV 
calculated at 4:00 p.m. tomorrow.55 Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment 
Company Act defines the term “value” to mean “(i) with respect to 
securities for which market quotations are readily available, the market 
value of such securities; and (ii) with respect to other securities and assets, 
fair value as determined in good faith by the board of directors.”56 Among 
Guilty, IGNITES, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.ignites.com/home/members/article.html?id=974227018; 
Guilty Pleas from Security Trust Execs, IGNITES, Aug. 31, 2005, http://www.ignites.com/home/ 
members/article.html?id=974227262; John Hechinger, Ex-Broker at Prudential Is Charged, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 3, 2005, at C13; In Rarity, Spitzer Drops Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at C1; Tom 
Lauricella & Paul Davies, Spitzer Retreats from Another Fund Prosecution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 
2005, at C1; Second Former Prudential Broker Charged with Fraud, Intends to Plead Guilty, 37 Sec. 
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1481 (Sept. 5, 2005; Security Trust Guilty Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, 
at C15.  
 For civil enforcement cases against brokerage firms that effected market-timing trades, see SEC 
Sues Broker, Alleging He Made Abusive Mutual Fund Trades, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (July 8, 
2005) (reporting injunctive proceeding against registered representative for executing late trades for 
hedge fund clients, then falsifying records to conceal them); Deborah Solomon, CIBC Agrees to Settle 
Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2005, at C13 ($100 million civil money penalty for bank that 
financed Canary Capital Partners LLC). 
 54. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (2005). Rule 2a-4(a) under the Investment Company Act defines 
the term “current net asset value” for purposes of making that calculation. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a) 
(2005). For SEC interpretive positions on pricing a mutual fund’s assets, see Guide 28 to Form N-1A, 
6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 51,208 at 39,261-62; Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” 
Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,135, at 62,284-86 (Oct. 21, 1969); Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, 
6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 51,301, at 39,583–84 (June 9, 1972); Accounting for Investment 
Securities by Registered Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 5120, Exchange Act 
Release No. 9049, Investment Company Act Release No. 6295, [Accounting Series Releases Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,140 (Dec. 23, 1970); Investment Company Institute, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,658, at 76,385–86 (Dec. 9, 
1999); Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,113 (Apr. 30, 2001). 
 55. See Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,288, 81 SEC Docket 2553, 2554 (Dec. 11, 2003). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(B) (2000). The SEC was sued in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in July 2004 on allegations that statements made by the SEC about “fair value” pricing 
in the context of the adoption of compliance program rules under the Investment Company Act were 
improper in that they had the effect of a legislative rule without following the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s requirements of notice and opportunity for comment. DH2, Inc. v. SEC, 422 F.3d 
591, 594 (7th Cir. 2005). In September 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed 
the petition on the ground that DH2 had no standing to challenge the SEC’s rules because it is merely 
an investor, not a registered investment company. Id. at 596–97. 
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other things, Canary Capital was exploiting anomalies in the price of 
securities held by global funds where a significant event had occurred after 
the market had closed in London or the Far East (i.e., there was a market 
quotation that was readily available from earlier in the day but it had 
become “stale” as a result of events that occurred after the market had 
closed), or was effecting trades after 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time (“late-
trading”) when a significant event had occurred in the U.S. markets after 
the U.S. markets had closed.57 Arguably, the former problem could be 
“cured” if the board of directors of a mutual fund were to “fair value” the 
portfolio securities held by global or international funds before the NAV is 
calculated at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time in the event that their prices have 
become “stale”; however, there is no “cure” for trades illegally entered 
after 4:00 p.m. without the knowledge of the mutual fund (and/or its 
service providers) other than the pursuit of civil and criminal actions 
against the lawbreakers after the fact. 
Since the announcement of the Canary Capital settlement, a number of 
enforcement actions have been brought by the SEC, NASD, and the 
attorneys general of a number of states against mutual fund advisers and 
broker-dealers under the Investment Company Act, the Securities Act of 
1933 (“1933 Act”),58 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange 
 It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss Rule 2a-4 and § 2(a)(41)(B) in depth. It should be 
noted, however, that (i) pricing an equity security in reliance on the last “round lot” traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange may not be appropriate where a mutual fund holds a large position, (ii) pricing a 
bond that has never been traded using a “matrix” that attempts to estimate what the sale price for that 
bond would be based on the characteristics of bonds that have traded is necessarily merely an educated 
estimate, and (iii) “small cap” and “micro cap” stocks have very thin trading markets. Richard D. 
Marshall, Pricing and Liquidity, in THE INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION DESKBOOK, 5-4 to 5-8 
(Amy L. Goodman ed., 1997, rev. 1998). Because there are differing elements of subjectivity in 
pricing virtually every type or class of asset held by mutual funds—not just foreign securities trading 
in markets that close prior to 4:00 p.m. in non-Eastern time-zones—regulatory policy should recognize 
that elements of subjectivity necessarily exist in calculating a mutual fund’s NAV. See Arden Dale, 
Mutual Funds Consider ‘Fair Value’, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2005, at C15 (account of survey by 
Deloitte & Touche finding that more mutual funds are hiring outside firms to help value stocks and 
bonds held in their investment portfolios).  
 57. Marshall, supra note 56, at 5-11, 5-12. The mutual fund industry has, for years, authorized 
third parties to serve as sub-transfer agents for the purpose of determining the time that a purchase 
order or request for redemption was received. See Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
[1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,353, at 77,768 (July 7, 1997). Other traders 
routinely interface with the mutual fund’s transfer agent through a broker-dealer, a bank, or a third-
party pension administrator, each of which takes orders from its clients up to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time, 
then transmits a “batched” net order to the mutual fund transfer agent after 4:00 p.m. of the orders that 
it represents that it processed in fact before the 4:00 p.m. cut-off. If the person transmitting orders to 
the mutual fund’s transfer agent disrespects the sanctity of the 4:00 p.m. cut-off, the mutual fund’s 
transfer agent may well be unable to detect the cheating if the third party placed its orders on an 
omnibus basis. 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–(aa) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
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Act”),59 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”),60 NASD 
rules, and state securities laws.61 To date, most of the settled cases involve 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–(nn) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -27 (2000 & Supp. 2005). Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers 
Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1),(2)) impose federal fiduciary duties on registered investment advisers in 
that they prohibit employing “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective 
client,” or engaging “in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or 
deceit upon any client or prospective client.” See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 194–201 (1963) (failure to disclose “scalping” justified imposition of an injunction requiring 
disclosure). Section 206(4) prohibits “any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative” and gives the Commission rulemaking authority to define such acts, 
practices, and courses of business. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4). The Commission has adopted rules regarding 
advertising, custody and possession of client funds and securities, cash referral fees, and disclosure of 
financial and disciplinary information. 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(4)-1 to -4 (2005).  
 61. Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,255, 81 SEC Docket 
1913 (Nov. 13, 2003) (partial settlement alleging violations of sections 203(e)(6), 204A, 206(1), and 
206(2) of the Advisers Act and sections 17(j) and Rule 17j-1 under the Investment Company Act); see 
also Brean Murray & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 51,219, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,761, 84 SEC Docket 3014 (Feb. 17, 2005) (alleging aiding and abetting violations of Rule 22c-1 
under the Investment Company Act—civil money penalty of $150,000); Fremont Inv. Advisors, Inc., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,650, 84 SEC Docket 231 (Nov. 4, 2004) (alleging violations 
of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 34(b), Rules 17d-1, and 22c-1 of 
the Investment Company Act—disgorgement of $2.146 million, civil money penalty of $2 million); 
Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,506, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,629, 83 SEC Docket 2872 (Oct. 8, 2004) (alleging violations of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the 
Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 34(b), and Rule 17-3-1 of the Investment Company Act—
disgorgement of $225 million, penalty of $140 million); RS Inv Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company Act 
26,627, 83 SEC Docket 2828 (Oct. 6, 2004) (alleging violations of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the 
Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 34(b), and Rule 17d-1 of the Investment Company Act—
disgorgement of $11.5 million, civil money penalty of $13.5 million); Charles Schwab & Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 50,360, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,595, 83 SEC Docket 
2252 (Sept. 14, 2005) (alleging violation of Rule 22c-1 of the Investment Company Act—civil money 
penalty of $350,000); PA Fund Mgmt. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50,354, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,594, 83 SEC Docket 2228 (Sept. 13, 2004) (alleging violations of sections 204A, 
206(1), and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 34(b), and Rule 17(d)-1 of the Investment 
Company Act—disgorgement of $10 million and civil money penalty of $40 million); Janus Capital 
Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,532, 83 SEC Docket 1766 (Aug. 18, 2004) 
(alleging violations of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 34(b), and 
Rule 17d-1 of the Investment Company Act—disgorgement of $50 million, civil money penalty of $50 
million); Inviva, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8456, Exchange Act Release No. 50,166, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,527, 83 SEC Docket 1567 (Aug. 9, 2004) (alleging violations of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act and section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act—
disgorgement of $3.5 million, civil money penalty of $1.5 million); CIHC, Inc., Securities Act Release 
No. 8455, Exchange Act Release No. 50,165, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,526, 83 SEC 
Docket 1558 (Aug. 9, 2004) (alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange 
Act, section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act—
disgorgement of $7.5 million, civil money penalty of $7.5 million); Franklin Advisers, Inc., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,523, 83 SEC Docket 1530 (Aug. 2, 2004) (alleging 
violations of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and section 34(b) of the Investment 
Company Act—disgorgement of $30 million, civil money penalty of $20 million); Banc One Inv. 
Advisors Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,490, 83 SEC Docket 695 (June 29, 2004) 
(alleging violations of sections 204A, 206(1), and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 
34(b), and Rule 17d-1 of the Investment Company Act—disgorgement of $10 million, civil money 
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penalty of $40 million); Pilgrim Baxter & Assoc., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,470, 83 
SEC Docket 363 (June 21, 2004) (alleging violations of sections 204A, 206(1), and 206(2) of the 
Advisers Act and section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act—disgorgement of $40 million, civil 
money penalty of $50 million); Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 82 SEC Docket 3178 (May 20, 2004) (alleging 
violations of sections 204A, 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and section 34(b) of the Investment 
Company Act—disgorement of $40 million, civil money penalty of $40 million); Mass. Fin. Serv. Co., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,347, 82 SEC Docket 341 (Feb. 5, 2004) (alleging violations 
of section 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act—
disgorgement of $175 million, civil money penalties of $50 million); Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312, 81 SEC Docket 2800 (Dec. 18, 2003) (alleging 
violations of sections 204A, 206(1), and 206(2) of the Advisers Act and sections 17(d), 20(a), 24(b) 
and Rules 17d-1 and 20a-1 under the Investment Company Act—disgorgement of $150 million, civil 
money penalty of $100 million); Franklin Advisers, Inc., Consent Order, Docket No. E-2004-007 
(Mass. Sec. Div., Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/ftconsentorder.pdf (alleging 
violations of MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 110A, § 101—penalty of $5 million); Press Release, Mass. Att’y 
Gen., Putnam Investment Admits Wrong Doing; Fined $50 million in Market Timing Case (Apr. 8, 
2004), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/putnampressrelease.pdf (disgorgement of $5 million, civil 
penalty of $50 million); Press Release, N.J. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Harvey Announces $18 
Million Settlement with Allianz Dresdner Asset Management of America, PA Distributors and PEA 
Capital (June 1, 2004), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/newsreleases04/pr20040601a.html (alleging 
violations of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-52 (West)—disgorgement of $3 million, penalty of $15 million); 
Press Release, NASD, Jefferson Pilot to Pay Over $500,000 in First VUL Market Timing Action; 
NASD Also fines Affiliate $125,000 for Email Retention Violations (Mar. 16, 2005), http://www. 
nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE%ssDocName-NASDW_013566 (alleging failure 
to prevent holders of variable universal life insurance policies from engaging in market-timing 
transactions in sub-accounts of the separate account—disgorgement of $238,697, fine of $325,000); 
Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines Davenport & Co. in First Case of Deceptive Market Timing in 
Variable Annuities (June 1, 2004), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE& 
ssDocName=NASDW_002824 (alleging deceptive market timing in variable annuity contracts and a 
failure to prevent late trading—disgorgement of $288,000, fine of $450,000); Press Release, NASD, 
NASD Fines H&R Block Financial Advisors $500,000 for Enabling Deceptive Market Timing, Orders 
Payment of $325,000 in Restitution (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService 
=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_012819 (announcing disgorgement of $325,000 and 
penalty of $500,000); Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines Sentinel Financial Services $700,000 for 
Failing to Prevent Market timing (Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService 
=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_011624 (announcing disgorgement of $659,674 and 
penalty of $40,326); Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines State Street Research Investment Services $1 
Million for Market Timing Supervision Violations; Firm Ordered to Pay More Than $500,000 in 
Restitution (Feb. 19, 2004), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE& 
ssDocName=NASDW_002852 (alleging failure to prevent market timing due to inadequate 
supervisory systems—disgorgement of $500,000, fine of $1 million); Press Release, NASD, NASD 
Orders First-Ever Suspension of Mutual Fund Business and $600,000 in Sanctions Against National 
Securities Corp. for Deceptive Market Timing Practices (Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.nasd.com/ 
web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_010888 (announcing disgorgement 
of $300,000 and penalty of $300,000); Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Regulation 
Fines Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated $13.5 million (Mar. 8, 2005), 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1110282618687.html (alleging failure to supervise registered 
representatives who engaged in market timing, opening accounts at mutual funds outside Merrill 
Lynch to execute trades—fine of $13.5 million, $10 million payable to New Jersey, $3.5 million 
payable to Connecticut); Press Release, SEC, SEC Reaches Agreement in Principle to Settle Charges 
Against Bank of America for Market Timing and Late Trading (Mar. 15, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-33.htm (announcing a settlement in principle—disgorgement of 
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alleged charges that the investment adviser breached its fiduciary duty 
under the Advisers Act by allowing market-timing transactions to occur 
contrary to statements in the affected mutual fund’s prospectus that 
market-timing transactions were prohibited or severely restricted.62 None 
of the settled cases involve alleged charges against members of the mutual 
fund’s board of directors who were independent—instead, there is usually 
an allegation that the investment adviser failed to inform the mutual fund’s 
board of directors of the precise nature of the market-timing activities that 
it was allowing to occur.63  
To address these issues, the Commission has adopted amendments to 
Form N-1A that require enhanced disclosure of a mutual fund’s risks, 
policies, and procedures concerning market-timing, selective disclosure of 
portfolio holdings, and the use of “fair value” pricing.64 The Commission 
also proposed amendments to Rule 22c-1 that would provide that, for an 
order to purchase or redeem shares to receive the NAV calculated by the 
mutual fund for today, the designated transfer agent or registered clearing 
agency must receive the order by the time the mutual fund establishes for 
calculating its NAV.65 To bring previously unregulated hedge fund 
$250 million, civil penalty of $125 million); Press Release, SEC, SEC’s Division of Enforcement 
Announces Agreement to Settle Civil Fraud Charges Against Fleet’s Columbia Mutual Fund Adviser 
and Distributor for Undisclosed Market Timing (Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-
34.htm (announcing a settlement in principle—disgorgement of $70 million, civil money penalty of 
$70 million). 
 62. See, e.g., Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,312A, 81 
SEC Docket 3401 (Dec. 18, 2005). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 
Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 82 SEC Docket 2357, 
2357 (Apr. 16, 2004) (adopting release); Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective 
Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, Securities Act Release No. 8343, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,287, 81 SEC Docket 2425, 2425–26 (Dec. 11, 2003) (proposing release). 
 65. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,288, 81 SEC Docket 2553, 2553–54 (Dec. 11, 2003) (proposing release). This 
proposal, often referred to as the “hard 4:00 p.m. close,” would disadvantage every investor who 
accesses a mutual fund through a third-party—a broker-dealer, bank, or third-party pension 
administrator—which would be required, as a practical matter, to cease taking orders by around 1:30 
p.m. Eastern Time (for example), to be able to submit its “batched” net order to the mutual fund’s 
transfer agent by 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time. See GAO: Proposed SEC Rules Could Affect Pension Plan 
Participants More Than Others, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1483 (Aug. 16, 2004) (relating GAO 
report that the proposal would create new costs for all long-term mutual fund shareholders, especially 
defined-contribution-plan participants); Lawmakers Warn ‘Hard 4’ Proposal May Have Unintended 
Consequences, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 614 (Apr. 5, 2004) (reporting that the chairs of the 
House Committee on Financial Services and its Subcommittee on Capital Markets have expressed 
concern that the proposal will harm innocent investors); Senators Ask SEC to Consider Effect of 
Reform on Plan Participants, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 613 (Apr. 5, 2004) (reporting request 
from the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Committee on Finance that the SEC consider the 
effect of the proposed rule on retirement plan participants).  
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advisers into its regulatory fold, the Commission adopted Rule 203(b)(3)-2 
under the Advisers Act.66 The rule redefines the term “client” in order to 
require certain investment advisers to hedge funds and other private 
investment companies to register under section 203(c) of the Advisers 
Act,67 notwithstanding the exception to registration in section 203(b)(3) 
thereof68 for an investment adviser with fewer than fifteen clients that is 
not holding itself out to the public.69 Finally, the SEC proposed that 
mutual funds be required to impose a mandatory redemption fee of two 
percent, payable to the mutual fund if an investor engages in rapid 
trading,70 but in March 2005 adopted new Rule 22c-2 authorizing (but not 
 66. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2333, 84 SEC Docket 1032, 1032 (Dec. 2, 2004) (adopting release) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-(2)).  
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (2000). 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2005). The critical term is the word “client,” which, since 1940, 
has consistently been treated as the person or entity receiving advice from the investment adviser, not 
the individual members or owners of the entity, unless the investment adviser also advises them 
individually. The practical effect of Rule 203(b)(3)-2 is to treat every investor in a hedge fund as a 
separate client of the hedge fund’s adviser, even when the adviser has no actual client relationship with 
the investor. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 66, 
at 1033–58. 
 The Commission was sued over the adoption of Rule 203(b)(3)-2 in December 2004. Petition, 
Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2004). Like the Chamber of Commerce, Mr. 
Goldstein also sued the Commission simultaneously in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Oral argument occurred on December 9, 2005. For press reports of the oral argument, see Judith 
Burns, Court Questions SEC Regulation for Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2005, at A4; Carrie 
Johnson, Appeals Judges Question SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at D1; 
Stephen Labaton, Judges Weigh Hedge Funds vs. the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at B1. For 
two editorials regarding Rule 203(b)(3)-2, see Jenny Anderson, Should Hedge Funds Be Exempt From 
an Exemption?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at C5 (arguing that requiring hedge fund advisers to 
become registered investment advisers will exempt them from the short-swing profits prohibition in 
section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, a perverse incentive for registering); John Berlan, Who Is Watching 
the Watchdog?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2005, at A14 (arguing that the rule also applies to most venture 
capital and private equity funds, a danger Congress has repeatedly tried to avoid). 
 70. Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,375A, 82 SEC Docket 1419, 1419 (Mar. 5, 2004) (proposed rule requiring mandatory 
redemption fees). Sections 22(e) and 22(f) of the Investment Company Act prohibit a mutual fund 
from suspending the right of redemption, postponing the date of payment, or restricting the 
transferability of any security of which it is the issuer; thus, for years mutual funds were not able to 
impose any kind of redemption fees to deter rapid trading. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e)–(f) (2000). Cf. 
United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 729–30 (1975) (the restrictions in section 22(f) on distribution 
that would otherwise be per se violations of the Sherman Act are immune from antitrust liability).  
 In 1989, in the context of adopting rules regarding exchanges under section 11 of the Investment 
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-11, the Commission first permitted the imposition of redemption fees. 
17 C.F.R. § 270.11a-3(b)(2) (2005) (a security holder may be charged a redemption fee that is applied 
uniformly, and any scheduled variation must be reasonably related to the costs to the mutual fund of 
processing that type of redemption). Because of (i) the clear prohibitions in Sections 22(e) and 22(f) 
and the notion that every shareholder (even a market-timer) had the statutory right to redeem without 
the imposition of a penalty and (ii) the fact that the redemption fees authorized by Rule 11a-3 must 
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requiring) a mutual fund to impose a redemption fee of up to two percent 
on shares that are redeemed within seven days of purchase.71  
B. Revenue-Sharing 
In November 2003, the SEC and NASD settled cases against Morgan 
Stanley DW Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”) for allegedly failing to disclose to its 
brokerage customers that it had had a Preferred Partners Program since 
2002 in which its registered representatives were paid higher commissions 
and received other extra compensation from Morgan Stanley and from the 
mutual fund advisers in the Preferred Partners Program for selling shares 
relate to administrative and processing costs associated with a redemption request and not the actual 
“damage” that a redemption might cause a mutual fund, the SEC staff was reluctant to sanction 
redemption fees of more than two percent Compare Chase Fund of Boston, SEC No-Action Letter, 
[1989–1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,332 (Sept. 9, 1989) (withdrawing previous 
no-action letter limiting redemption fees to five dollars), with Newberger & Berman Genesis Fund, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235038, at *13 (Sept. 27, 1988) (a redemption fee would not 
create a senior security for purposes of Section 18(f)(1) of the Investment Company Act), and John P. 
Reilly & Assocs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14677, at *1 (July 12, 1979) (redemption fee in 
excess of two percent may cause the shares not to be considered “redeemable securities”). If 
redemption fees are going to act as a brake on rapid trading, the higher the redemption fee is, the more 
likely that it will act as a brake. Accordingly, some mutual funds determined as a matter of business 
judgment to impose redemption fees of two percent for some funds—for example, S&P 500 Index 
funds that seemed to be inviting targets for investors who wanted to “long” a mutual fund with very 
predictable portfolio holdings and “short” a derivative or S&P 500 futures contract to create a hedge. 
Where the investor has inside information about the exact nature of the mutual fund’s portfolio 
holdings, it is possible to create a better hedge and even a two percent redemption fee appeared to have 
little deterrent effect on a determined market-timer or late-trader. See infra note 123. 
 71. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 84 SEC 
Docket 3664 (Mar. 11, 2005) (adopting release). See SEC Gives Funds Redemption Fee Option, but 
Requires Contract with Intermediaries, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 393 (Mar. 7, 2005); Deborah 
Solomon, Mutual Fund Boards Get Break over Penalizing Rapid Traders, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2005, 
at C3 . New Rule 22c-2 under the Investment Company Act will require information-sharing between 
mutual funds and intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, banks, and third-party administrators, to 
allow the mutual fund’s transfer agent to surveil for market-timers and late-traders behind omnibus 
accounts. Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, supra, at 3669. The intermediaries will have to agree to 
implement a mutual fund’s instructions and impose trading restrictions on their customers. Id. New 
Rule 22c-2 will not apply to money market funds or exchange-traded funds, or mutual funds that 
encourage active trading and disclose in their prospectuses that active trading will impose costs on the 
fund. Id. at 3668 n.26. There is also no restriction on how long the embargo period on rapid trading 
can be, leaving that also to the business judgment of individual mutual funds. Id. at 3669. The 
Commission decided to seek additional comment on whether it should set uniform standards for 
redemption fees, whether exceptions should be standardized, and whether the embargo period should 
be calculated on a first-in/first-out basis or some other assumption. Id. at 3672–75. New Rule 22c-2 
will have a compliance date in October 2006, giving the mutual fund industry eighteen months to 
come into compliance. Id. at 3676. Cf. Arden Dale, Van Kampen Plans to Levy New Fees, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 4, 2005, at C11; Tom Leswing, ICI Readies New Attack on Timers, IGNITES, Aug. 24, 2005, 
http://www.ignites.com/home/members/article.html?id=974227179; Tom Leswing, Redemption Fee 
Rule May Carry $1B Price Tag, IGNITES, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.ignites.com/home/members/ 
article.html?id=974227078.  
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of the mutual funds in the Preferred Partners Program.72 Specifically, it 
was alleged that fourteen third-party mutual fund complexes paid Morgan 
Stanley fifteen or twenty basis points on gross sales of mutual fund shares, 
and five basis points on “aged assets,” i.e., mutual fund shares held for 
more than one year. The five basis point component of the Preferred 
Partners Program was paid to the participating registered representatives, 
who also received a higher commission payout for selling mutual funds in 
the Preferred Partners Program than for other mutual funds.73 “Revenue-
sharing” payments made by an investment adviser out of its own pocket 
are not subject to Rule 12b-1 under the Investment Company Act.74  
Rule 10b-10 under the Exchange Act requires the disclosure of certain 
information to a broker-dealer’s customer on the confirmation statement, 
including “[t]he source and amount of any other remuneration received or 
to be received by the broker in connection with the transaction.”75 In 1977, 
 72. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8339, Exchange Act Release No. 
48,789, 81 SEC Docket 1993, 1996, 2001 (Nov. 17, 2003) (alleging violations of section 17(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act, Rule 10b-10 under the Exchange Act, and NASD Rule 2830(k)—disgorgement of 
$25 million, civil penalties of $25 million). As part of the settlement, Morgan Stanley agreed to an 
undertaking to provide customers with a disclosure statement concerning compensation received by 
the firm and its registered representatives in connection with the sale of shares of mutual funds through 
the Preferred Partners Program. Id. at 1999. See Kathy Chu, “Preferred” Funds Get More Money, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at C19 (describing use of “preferred” groups of investments). 
 73. Id. at 1994–95. 
 74. As a matter of law, nothing prohibits an investment adviser from using its “legitimate 
profits,” see supra text accompanying note 35, in any way that it sees fit, including compensating 
selling broker-dealers for providing “shelf space,” for allowing the investment adviser access to the 
selling broker-dealer’s registered representatives, and for providing opportunities to educate the selling 
broker-dealer’s sales force about the mutual funds served by the investment adviser. See supra note 31. 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2)(i)(D) (2005). The NASD has its own disclosure requirements 
related to receipt of cash compensation. NASD Rule 2830(l)(4) prohibits a member from accepting 
any cash compensation that is not described in a current prospectus for the investment company, and 
prohibits the receipt of “special cash compensation” that is not made available on the same terms to all 
members unless the name of the member and details of the arrangements are disclosed in the 
prospectus. The NASD has taken the position that these requirements may be met by disclosure in the 
mutual fund’s Statement of Additional Information rather than in the prospectus. Questions and 
Answers Relating to Non-Cash Compensation Rules, NASD Notice to Members 99-55, at 357–58 
(1999), http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_004217. 
pdf. The NASD did not, however, resolve during the 1990s how Rule 2830(l)(4)—either the cash 
compensation or special cash compensation clauses—applied to revenue-sharing arrangements. See 
Salesperson Compensation Practices, NASD Notice to Members 99-81 (1999), http://www.nasd. 
com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_004080.pdf; NASD Regulation 
Requests Comment on Regulation of Payment and Receipt of Cash Compensation Incentives, 
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/nasdw_004655. pdf; NASD 
Solicits Member Comment on Proposed Rules Relating to Prospectus Disclosure of Cash and Non-
Cash Compensation, NASD Notice to Members 96-68, 1996 WL 1771346. NASD Notice to Members 
97-50 (1997), NASD Rule 2820(g) does not impose any disclosure obligations on members regarding 
compensation arrangements related to variable contracts. NASD Regulation Requests Comment on 
Regulation of Payment and Receipt of Cash Compensation Incentives, supra, at 407 (“NASD Rules 
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when adopting Rule 10b-10, the Commission stated that if the required 
information is set forth in a final prospectus delivered to the customer at 
the time of the transaction, then a broker-dealer need not provide the 
information separately on the confirmation.76 Nonetheless, to address this 
aspect of the Morgan Stanley case, the Commission has proposed to 
amend the requirements of Form N-1A (the form for registering mutual 
funds under the 1933 Act and the Investment Company Act) to require 
increased disclosure of the investment adviser’s “revenue-sharing” 
payments,77 and has proposed new Rules 15c2-2 and 15c2-3 under the 
Exchange Act, as well as amendments to Rule 10b-10, to require improved 
confirmation disclosure for transactions in mutual fund shares and point-
of-sale disclosure prior to effecting transactions in mutual fund shares.78  
for variable products do not contain any requirements regarding prospectus disclosure of cash 
compensation arrangements.”). 
 Courts have concluded that disclosure of an individual registered representative’s compensation is 
not required. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1987); Benzon v. 
Morgan Stanley, No. 3:03-0159, 2004 WL 62747, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 8, 2004); United States v. 
Alvarado, No. 01 CR. 156(RPP), 2001 WL 1631396, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2001) (Rule 10b-10 
focuses on the total compensation to the firm, not the internal allocation of compensation); Castillo v. 
Dean Witter Discover & Co., [1998 Supplement Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,249, 
at 91,099 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 
§ 14.14[1] (4th ed. 2002). 
 76. Securities Confirmations, Exchange Act Release No. 13,508, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 9753, 12 SEC Docket 299, 305 (May 5, 1977). Investment Company Institute, SEC No-
Action Letter (Apr. 18, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,041, at 81,655 
(permitting the use of confirmations that omitted information about remuneration received by the 
selling broker provided that the prospectus for the mutual fund contained disclosure of sales charges, 
breakpoints, and maximum dealer discounts). But see Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act LEXIS 435 (Mar. 16, 1994) (stating that commissions for investment 
company transactions should be disclosed on confirmations and announcing its intent to withdraw the 
1979 no-action letter, but no further action to withdraw the letter was taken).  
 77. Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for Transactions in 
Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, Securities Act Release No. 8358, Exchange Act Release 
No. 49,148, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,341, 82 SEC Docket 5, 6, 10 n.20 (Jan. 29, 
2004). See also Compensation for the Sale of Investment Company Securities, NASD Notice to 
Members 03-54 (2003), http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/ 
nasdw_003152.pdf (proposed change to NASD Rule 2830 requiring disclosure of revenue sharing). 
The SEC has reopened the comment period on these rules for an additional thirty days and made a 
supplemental request for comment. Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements and Confirmation 
Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 8544, Exchange Act Release No. 51,274, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,778, 84 SEC Docket 3182 (Feb. 28, 2005); Atkins Says Internet Could 
Be Key to Crafting Mutual Fund Disclosure Rule, 85 Banking Rep. (BNA) 20 (July 4, 2005) 
(discussing reactions to the re-issue of the proposal).  
 78. Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements and Confirmation Requirements, supra note 77. 
Specifically, Rule 15c2-2 would require specific confirmation disclosure of information about front-
end loads and deferred sales loads and other distribution-related costs that directly impact the returns 
earned by investors in mutual fund shares, brokers would be required to disclose their compensation 
for selling those securities, including “revenue-sharing” and directed-brokerage arrangements, and 
brokers would have to disclose whether they are receiving extra compensation for selling certain fund 
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Since the announcement of the Morgan Stanley settlement, the SEC 
and NASD have brought several enforcement actions against mutual fund 
advisers and broker-dealers regarding “revenue-sharing.”79 To date, 
virtually all of the settled cases involve allegations either that the 
investment adviser breached its fiduciary duty by using fund assets to pay 
for distribution of mutual fund shares outside of a properly adopted Rule 
12b-1 plan, notwithstanding general disclosure in the affected mutual 
fund’s prospectus that “revenue-sharing” payments were being made by 
the mutual fund’s investment adviser,80 or that the broker-dealer failed 
adequately to disclose its conflicts of interest with sufficient specificity to 
the brokerage customer at the point of sale.81 None of the settled cases 
involves charges against members of the mutual fund’s board of directors 
who were independent—instead, there is usually an allegation that the 
shares. Id. at 3199–200. The Commission intends to withdraw the no-action letter issued in 1979 to the 
Investment Company Institute by the Division of Market Regulation. Confirmation Requirements and 
Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, 
and Other Confirmation Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for 
Mutual Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8358, Exchange Act Release No. 49,148, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,341 (Jan. 29, 2004).  
 Rule 15c2-3 would require broker-dealers to provide point-of-sale disclosure of transaction-
specific information about distribution-related costs, and of remuneration arrangements that lead to 
conflicts of interest for broker-dealers prior to effecting transactions in mutual fund shares. Point of 
Sale Disclosure Requirements and Confirmation Requirements, supra note 77, at 3186. 
 79. Edward D. Jones & Co., Securities Act Release No. 8520, Exchange Act Release No. 50,910, 
84 SEC Docket 1799, 1801–10 (Dec. 22, 2004) (alleging violations of section 17(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act, section 15(B)(c)(1) and Rule 10b-10 under the Exchange Act, and Rule G-15 of the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board—disgorgement of $37.5 million, civil money penalty of 
$37.5 million); Franklin Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 50,841, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,692, 84 SEC Docket 1357, 1360–62 (Dec. 13, 2004) (alleging violations of section 
206(2) of the Advisers Act, section 17(d) and Rule 17d-1 under the Investment Company Act and 
aiding and abetting such violations, and section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act—disgorgement 
of $1, civil money penalty of $20 million); PA Fund Mgmt. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50, 384, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,598, 83 SEC Docket 2287, 2292–99 (Sept. 15, 2004) 
(alleging violations of section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, sections 15(c), 17(d), 34(b) and Rules 12b-
1(d) and 17d-1 under the Investment Company Act, and aiding and abetting violations of Section 12(b) 
and Rule 12b-1(b)—disgorgement of $6.6 million, civil money penalties of $5 million); Mass. Fin. 
Servs. Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,409, 82 SEC Docket 2036, 2039–40, 2042 (Mar. 
31, 2004) (alleging violations of section 206(2) of the Advisers Act, and section 34(b) of the 
Investment Company Act—disgorgement of $1, civil penalty of $50 million); Press Release, NASD, 
NASD Charges 15 Firms with Directed Brokerage Violations, Imposes Fines Totaling More Than $34 
Million (June 8, 2005), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GETPAGE&ssDocName= 
NASDW_014340 (alleging violations of NASD Rule 2830(k); Press Release, NASD, NASD Fines 
Quick & Reilly, Piper Jaffray $845,000 for Directed Brokerage Violations (Feb. 22, 2005), 
http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013402 
(alleging violations of NASD Rule 2830(k)—fine of $570,000). 
 80. See, e.g., PA Fund Mgmt. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 50,384, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,598, 83 SEC Docket 2287, 2292–93 (Sept. 15, 2004).  
 81. See, e.g., Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., Securities Act Release No. 8520, Exchange Act 
Release No. 50,910, 84 SEC Docket 1798, 1801 (Dec. 22, 2004). 
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investment adviser failed to inform the mutual fund’s board of directors of 
the precise nature of the “revenue-sharing” activities in which it was 
engaging.82  
C. Directed Brokerage 
Some investment advisers used brokerage commissions incurred in 
effecting securities transactions for the mutual fund to make “revenue-
sharing” payments to Morgan Stanley.83 With respect to the receipt of 
payments by a broker-dealer in the form of brokerage commissions, before 
the Morgan Stanley case NASD Rule 2830(k) had provided:  
 (1) No member shall, directly or indirectly, favor or disfavor the 
sale or distribution of shares of any particular investment company 
or group of investment companies on the basis of brokerage 
commissions received or expected by the member from any source, 
including such investment company or any covered account. 
 82. See, e.g., supra note 81. 
 83. Mutual funds in the Preferred Partners Program using directed brokerage allegedly paid a 
negotiated multiple of the amount they would have paid in hard dollars. The Morgan Stanley trading 
desk retained one-third of the brokerage commissions to cover its expenses. In some instances, the 
credit for distribution was identified by the investment adviser after the securities transaction was 
executed solely for Morgan Stanley’s internal recording-keeping purposes. In some instances, Morgan 
Stanley was asked to “step-out” part of the securities transaction after it was effected to a clearing 
broker who would complete settlement of the transaction in part for the benefit of a broker-dealer that 
was selling shares of the mutual fund but was unable to effect or execute a securities transaction for its 
own account. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., supra note 72. See also American Beats Back Calif. AG, 
IGNITES, Nov. 16, 2005, http://www.ignites.com/articles/20051116/american_beats_back_calif. 
(noting that adoption of 1996 Amendments to Advisers Act preempts the State of California regarding 
directed-brokerage disclosure); Riva D. Atlas, NASD Says Fund Family Paid Improper Fees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at C1; California Court Rules U.S. Law Preempts Bid by AG to Regulate Fund 
Disclosure Statement, Sec. L. Daily (BNA), Nov. 30, 2005. Tom Lauricella, American Funds Sues 
Regulator, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2005, at C13 (reporting lawsuit by Capital Research & Management 
against the Attorney General of the State of California seeking an injunction and a declaration that the 
disclosure regarding directed brokerage in its American Funds prospectuses was accurate and the 
state’s fraud jurisdiction is preempted by the SEC’s comprehensive regulation of mutual fund 
prospectuses); Ian McDonald, NASD Takes Aim at American Funds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2005, at 
C17; Press Release, NASD, NASD Charges American Fund Distributors, Inc. with Arranging $100 
Million in Directed Brokerage Commissions for Top Sellers of American Funds (Feb. 16, 2005), http: 
//www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GETPAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013358 (announcing 
filing of an administrative complaint alleging violations of NASD Rule 2830(k) in that the investment 
adviser to American Funds directed brokerage to selling broker-dealers in an amount equal to ten to 
fifteen percent of last year’s sales). Cf. Court Finds No Private Remedies for Claims over Fund 
Marketing Practices, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1322 (Aug. 4, 2005) (reporting decision by the 
Southern District of New York regarding Eaton Vance Mutual Funds concluding that there are no 
private rights of action under the Investment Company Act).  
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 (2) No member shall, directly or indirectly, demand or require 
brokerage commissions or solicit a promise of such commissions 
from any source as a condition to the sale or distribution of shares 
of an investment company.  
 (3) No member shall, directly or indirectly, offer or promise to 
another member, brokerage commissions from any source as a 
condition to the sale or distribution of shares of an investment 
company and no member shall request or arrange for the direction 
to any member of a specific amount or percentage of brokerage 
commissions conditioned upon that member’s sales or promise of 
sales of shares of an investment company. 
 (4) No member shall circulate any information regarding the 
amount or level of brokerage commissions received by the member 
from any investment company or covered account to other than 
management personnel who are required, in the overall management 
of the member’s business, to have access to such information. 
 (5) No member shall, with respect to such member’s activities as 
underwriter of investment company shares, suggest, encourage, or 
sponsor any incentive campaign or special sales effort of another 
member with respect to the shares of any investment which 
incentive or sales effort is . . . to be based upon, or financed by, 
brokerage commissions directed or arranged by the underwriter-
member. 
 (6) No member shall, with respect to such member’s retail sales 
or distribution of investment company shares: (A) provide to 
salesmen, branch managers or other sales personnel any incentive or 
additional compensation for the sale of shares of specific investment 
companies based on the amount of brokerage commissions received 
or expected from any source, including such investment companies 
or any covered account. . . . ; (B) recommend specific investment 
companies to sales personnel, or establish “recommended,” 
“selected,” or “preferred” lists of investment companies, regardless 
of the existence of any special compensation or incentives to favor 
or disfavor the shares of such company or companies in sales 
efforts, if such companies are recommended or selected on the basis 
of brokerage commissions received or expected from any source;  
 (C) grant to salesmen, branch managers or other sales personnel 
any participation in brokerage commissions received by such 
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member from portfolio transactions of an investment company 
whose shares are sold by such member, or from any covered 
account, if such commissions are directed by, or identified with, 
such investment company or any covered account; or  
 (D) use sales of shares of any investment company as a factor in 
negotiating the price of, or the amount of brokerage commissions to 
be paid on, a portfolio transaction of an investment company or of 
any covered account . . . .84 
 
If all of these conditions could be met, then it was permissible for a 
member to: 
(A) . . . execut[e] portfolio transactions of any investment company 
or covered account by members who also sell shares of the 
investment company;  
(B) . . . sell[] shares of, or act[] as an underwriter for, an investment 
company which follows a policy, disclosed in its prospectus, of 
considering sales of shares of the investment company as a factor in 
the selection of broker/dealers to execute portfolio transactions, 
subject to the requirements of best execution; [or] 
(C) . . . compensat[e] its salesmen and managers based on total sales 
of investment company shares attributable to such salesmen or 
managers, whether by use of overrides, accounting credits, or other 
compensation methods, provided that such compensation is not 
designed to favor or disfavor sales of shares of particular investment 
companies on a basis prohibited by this paragraph (k).85  
 84. NASD Rule 2830(k)(1)–(6). 
 85. NASD Rule 2830(k)(7). As originally adopted in 1973, this position was characterized by the 
NASD as an interpretation and prohibited member firms from seeking portfolio brokerage based on 
their sale of shares of a mutual fund. See NASD Notice of Members 73-42 (May 1973) (“Anti-
Reciprocal Rule”). After the adoption of Rule 12b-1 in 1980, the NASD revised its Anti-Reciprocal 
Rule to allow mutual funds to consider sales of their shares as a factor in the selection of broker-
dealers to execute portfolio transactions, subject to best execution. NASD Notice to Members 80-7 
(Mar. 6, 1980) (initial discussion); NASD, Exchange Act Release No. 17,599, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 11,662, 22 SEC Docket 329, 331 (Mar. 4, 1981) (approval of NASD rule, stating “it 
is not inappropriate for [mutual funds] to seek to promote the sale of their shares through the 
placement of brokerage without the incurring any additional expense”). In 1984, the NASD issued 
guidance on the Anti-Reciprocal Rule emphasizing that that the rule continued to prohibit a number of 
practices, whether or not disclosed, and offered examples of practices that were prohibited. 
Compensation Arrangements with Respect to Sale of Mutual Fund Shares, NASD Notice to Members 
84-40 (1984), http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&record_id=115900 
5009. 
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To address this aspect of the Morgan Stanley case, the Commission has 
amended Rule 12b-1 by adding new paragraph (h), which prohibits a 
mutual fund from making “revenue-sharing” payments with brokerage 
commissions unless the mutual fund has implemented policies and 
procedures designed to ensure that the mutual fund adviser’s selection of 
selling brokers to execute portfolio securities transactions is not influenced 
by considerations about the sale of fund shares.86 The NASD also 
amended Rule 2830(k) to prohibit a broker-dealer from selling a mutual 
fund’s shares if the broker-dealer has any agreement or understanding with 
any party that portfolio transactions will be directed to the member in 
exchange for the promotion or sale of fund shares,87 which the 
Commission promptly approved.88 
 86. Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,591, 83 SEC Docket 2106, 2106 n.3, 2109–10 (Sept. 2, 2004) (adopting 
release); Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,356, 82 SEC Docket 892 (Feb. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,356] (proposing release). The proposing release observes: 
[The SEC’s] review of current practices . . . suggests that many arrangements that direct 
brokerage to reward selling brokers for distribution constitute more than mere allocation of 
brokerage, and are not consistent with our 1981 rationale for approving the exception to the 
NASD’s Anti-Reciprocal Rule. The use of multiple broker-dealers for execution, step-outs, 
and other arrangements . . . explicitly quantif[ies] the value of the distribution component of 
fund brokerage commission and belie the notion that fund advisers are merely ‘considering’ 
the selling efforts of the broker(s) involved. 
Id. at 896. 
 87. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to 
Investment Company Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 50,609, 84 SEC Docket 157 (Oct. 29, 
2004) (notice of proposed rule being filed with the SEC); Investment Company Directed Brokerage 
Arrangements, NASD Notice to Members 05-04 (Jan. 2005), http://nasd.complinet.com/file_store/pdf/ 
rulebooks/nasd_0504.pdf (announcement of SEC approval). In May 2004, the NASD formed a Mutual 
Fund Task Force to consider ways to improve the transparency of mutual fund portfolio transactions 
costs and distribution arrangements, and to provide guidance to the Commission. NASD Names 20 to 
Task Force on Mutual Fund Transparency, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1032 (May 28, 2004). Its 
first report was issued on November 11, 2004, and focused on “soft dollar” services and mutual fund 
transactions costs. MUTUAL FUND TASK FORCE, NASD, SOFT DOLLARS AND PORTFOLIO 
TRANSACTION COSTS 2004, http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/rules_regs/nasdw 
_012356.pdf. In its second phase, the Mutual Fund Task Force will focus on distribution arrangements, 
including Rule 12b-1 Plans and “revenue-sharing.” Press Release, NASD, NASD Endorses Concise, 
Web-Based Point of Sale Mutual Fund Disclosure (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg? 
IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013727 (announcing “Profile Plus,” “a two-page 
document providing basic information about a mutual fund,” the principal recommendation of the 
Mutual Fund Task Force’s report MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION).  
 The Investment Company Institute, Securities Industry Association, and Mutual Fund Directors 
Forum have supported eliminating directed brokerage arrangements. See Mutual Fund Directors 
Forum Advises End to Soft Dollars at Funds, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1384 (July 29, 2004); 
SEC Proposes Directed-Brokerage Ban, Adopts New Fee-Disclosure Requirements, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 293 (Feb. 16, 2004) (noting petition from the Investment Company Institute to the SEC to 
adopt rules prohibiting directed brokerage arrangements).  
 88. Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by NASD, Inc., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/5
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D. Some Thoughts on the Scandals 
The facts described in the Canary Capital complaint were both 
astonishing and appalling.89 The settlements, uniformly harsh, reflect the 
Commission’s deep disappointment with those in the securities industry 
who violated or facilitated violation of the letter and spirit of Rule 22c-1 
for personal gain and to the disadvantage of mutual fund shareholders.90 
The terms of the SEC market-timing settlements involving mutual fund 
advisers usually require, inter alia, that the board of directors of the 
affected mutual fund adopt a number of corporate governance changes that 
substantially mirror the Corporate Governance Amendments.91 The 
settlements also uniformly invoke the Fair Fund provisions in section 
308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act92 to provide for an independent 
Relating to Investment Company Portfolio Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 50,883, 84 SEC 
Docket 1835 (Dec. 20, 2004). 
 89. Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security of the S. Comm. on 
Government Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment 
Company Institute).  
 90. See supra note 61. It is understood that the SEC staff will not enter into serious settlement 
negotiations with the investment adviser unless the most senior person(s) who knew or should have 
known about the market-timing activities has been dismissed. To date, there have been very few 
settlements with individuals. Cf. Baxter, Securities Act Release No. 8506, Exchange Act Release No. 
50,681, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,656, 84 SEC Docket 340, 344 (Nov. 17, 2004) 
(senior executive barred from the securities industry—disgorgement of $60 million, civil penalty of 
$20 million); Pilgrim, Securities Act Release No. 8505, Exchange Act Release No. 50,680, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,655, 84 SEC Docket 335, 339–40 (Nov. 17, 2004) (same); Strong 
Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 
82 SEC Docket 3178, 3189–90 (May 20, 2004) (barring senior executives from association with 
broker-dealers and investment advisers). It is expected that, when time allows, the SEC staff will 
return to deal with those senior persons, and will also be interested in those who prepared and/or 
supervised the preparation of market-timing disclosure for the mutual fund’s prospectus and/or 
Statement of Additional Information that did not fully reflect the market-timing activities that were 
actually taking place. See SEC v. Treadway, 354 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (denial of 
motion to reconsider motion to dismiss by CEO and CIO of PIMCO Advisers Fund Management); see 
also Julie Creswall, S.E.C. Accuses Former Citigroup Executives of Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 9, 2005, at C3; Siobhan Hughes, SEC Wraps Up Probe of Amvescap Arm, WALL ST. J., July 20, 
2005, at C13 (two senior executives of AIM Distributors fined $225,000 and suspended for six- and 
nine-month periods from employment in the investment company industry); Mitchell Pacelle, 
Citigroup Ex-Officials Face Charges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2005, at C13 (reporting civil complaint 
filed alleging senior executives were principally responsible for fraud related to affiliated transfer 
agent contract). Cf. Arden Dale, Spitzer Effect: Not Quite Devastating, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2005, at 
C13 (noting that number of funds liquidated or merged has not increased appreciably and that 
increased costs of regulation has disproportionately affected small funds); Laura Johannes, Strong 
Performers Suffer Less in Mutual-Fund Scandals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2005, at C1 (reporting that 
investors have remained with mutual fund groups that have continued to achieve good performance 
notwithstanding regulatory issues, but not the converse).  
 91. See supra note 80. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (Supp. II 2002). Judith Burns, Cox Says Size Lags in Returning “Fair 
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distribution consultant to administer and dispense the funds deposited in 
the Fair Fund, consisting of both the amount to be disgorged and the civil 
money penalty.93 Finally, the settlements usually require the investment 
adviser to employ an independent compliance consultant to review its 
compliance with the federal securities laws and render reports to the 
Commission on specified dates.94 
With respect to revenue-sharing, it was generally believed that the 
Commission was well aware of mutual fund marketplaces95 and concepts 
like “shelf space” through inspections of investment advisers and broker-
dealers, processing mutual fund registration statements,96 and its 
Funds,” WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2005, at C3; SEC Put $4.8b Into Fair Fund for Return to Investors; 
Little Distributed, GAO Says, Securities L. Daily (BNA), Oct. 4, 2005 (discussing GAO report). Cf. 
Lynn Cowan, PBS Financial-Education Series Is Funded by Street’s Settlement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 
2005, at B2 (reporting Investor Protection Trust funded with $27.5 million from the $1.4 billion global 
research analysts settlement with Wall Street brokerage firms in 2003); Randall Smith & Ian 
McDonald, Frustrating Venture: SEC Education Fund to Lose Top Figures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 
2005, at C1 (reporting resignations of the chairman and several directors of the investor education 
fund); Deborah Solomon, What’s the Best Way to Invest in Teaching the U.S. to Invest?, WALL ST. J., 
May 26, 2005, at C1 (reporting SEC motion to allow the NASD to take control of the Federal 
education money); Robert Tomsho, Putnam Ex-Employee Wants His Cut, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2005, at 
C13 (reporting lawsuit against the Massachusetts Attorney General for $15 million under the state’s 
whistleblower statute for providing information about market-timing activities). 
 93. See supra note 80. The settlements usually provide that, regardless of whether any Fair Fund 
distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid as civil money penalties are to be treated as penalties 
payable to the U.S. government for all purposes, including Federal income tax purposes. To preserve 
the deterrent effect of the civil money penalty, the mutual fund adviser agrees that it shall not benefit 
from any offset or reduction in any related civil action. The market-timing settlements usually require 
the independent distribution consultant of the Fair Fund to make payments directly to the shareholders 
of the affected mutual funds. Id. See John Hechinger, Putnam May Owe $100 Million, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 2, 2005, at C1 (reporting apparent decision of the independent distribution consultant of the Fair 
Fund for Putnam finding that improper trading by Putnam employees cost between $3 million and $6 
million, improper trading in retirement and college plans cost $46 million, and the massive 
redemptions in the aftermath of the settlement cost $53 million in transaction costs); John Hechinger, 
Putnam to Pay $83.5 Million More in Restitution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2005, at C3; Putnam to Pay 
Additional $43M for Employees’ Questionable Fund Trades, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 399 (Mar. 
7, 2005). Cf. Arden Dale, Janus Argues Lawsuit Is Superfluous, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at C13 
(reporting motion arguing class action should be dismissed because fund investors’ losses will be more 
than covered by SEC action); Janus Scores Big Victory in Scandal Suit, IGNITES, Aug. 29, 2005, 
http://ignites.com/home/members/article.html?id=97422728 (reporting that Janus committed to paying 
$100 million through SEC action, while independent distribution consultant concluded that investors 
in Janus-advised mutual funds lost only about $22 million as a result of late trading). 
 94. See supra note 80. 
 95. See Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,477, at 78,437–38, Oct. 30, 1998 (discussing mutual fund marketplaces).  
 96. Form N-1A requires disclosure of the full panoply of compensation alternatives, including 
Items 3 and 8 (sales load), 15(f) (dealer reallowances and special cash compensation), 15(g) 
(distribution and service fees), 20 (underwriting commissions), 27 (compensation on redemptions and 
repurchases), 16 and 27 (brokerage commissions), and 20 (any other compensation made during the 
preceding year to underwriters and dealers). 6 Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ¶ 51,201 (2004). 
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involvement in private appellate litigation regarding these activities.97 
Accordingly, the Morgan Stanley enforcement case appears to represent a 
significant change of position on the Commission’s part.98 Unlike the 
market-timing settlements, several of the “revenue-sharing” settlements by 
investment advisers require disgorgement of only $1, with a substantial 
civil money penalty, solely to invoke the use of a Fair Fund to administer 
receipt and disbursal of the civil money penalty.99  
III. ADOPTION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AMENDMENTS IN 2004 
A. The SEC’s Preliminary Thoughts 
In adopting the Corporate Governance Amendments, the Commission 
made several preliminary observations about the role of independent 
directors. First, the Commission focused on the central role that 
independent directors play in policing the conflicts of interest that advisers 
inevitably have with the mutual funds that they advise, asserting that to be 
 For additional indications of the Commission’s awareness of revenue-sharing, see GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES: ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE COULD ENCOURAGE PRICE 
COMPETITION 40 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00126.pdf (report to the Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, and the Ranking Member, Committee on 
Commerce, House of Representatives describing revenue-sharing practices of investment advisers); 
SEC, THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS, supra note 44 (questions about 
revenue-sharing asked by the SEC Chairman and the Director of the SEC’s Office of Compliance 
Inspections Examinations); Debra Cope, Funds Slumping, but Conference Stronger Than Ever, AM. 
BANKER, Mar. 28, 1995, at 6 (reporting on remarks about revenue-sharing made at a conference by the 
Director of the Division of Investment Management). 
 The NASD was also aware of revenue-sharing. In 1994, the NASD solicited comments on a 
proposed rule addressing the receipt of compensation. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Notice of Filing 
of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Regulation of Cash and Non-Cash Compensation in 
Connection with the Sale of Investment Company Securities and Variable Contracts, NASD Solicits 
Member Comment on Cash and Non-Cash Compensation for Selling Investment Company and 
Variable Contract Securities, NASD Notice to Members 94-67 (1994), http://nasd.complinet.com/ 
nasd/display/display_display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=115900. See Self-Regulatory Organization; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Regulation of Non-Cash Compensation in 
Connection with the Sale of Investment Company Securities and Variable Contracts, Exchange Act 
Release No. 38,993, 65 SEC Docket 664 (Aug. 29, 1997) (discussing proposed changes to NASD 
Rules 2820 and 2830); Exchange Act Release No. 37,374, 62 SEC Docket 590, 609–24 (June 26, 
1996) (describing the comment letters submitted in response to NASD Notice to Members 94-67, and 
a letter dated November 22, 1994, from the Division of Investment Management to the NASD asking 
whether revenue-sharing was covered by the NASD’s Rules). 
 97. See Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in Response to the Court’s Request, Press v. Quick & 
Reilly, 218 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (Nos. 97-9153, 97-9159), 2000 WL 34447852. 
 98. See Tom Lauricella & Deborah Solomon, SEC Defended Fund-Broker Compacts in Past, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2004, at C1. 
 99. The independent distribution consultant of the Fair Fund in these cases is expected to make 
payments to the adviser’s mutual funds on the basis of their relative net assets. Mass. Fin. Services, 
supra note 79, ¶ 27. 
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truly effective, a mutual fund’s board of directors must be an independent 
force in the mutual fund’s affairs.100 Second, the Commission described 
the operation of section 15(c) and stated that the best way to ensure that 
mutual fund shareholders obtain fair and reasonable fees is through a 
marketplace of vigorous, independent, and diligent mutual fund boards of 
directors coupled with fully-informed investors.101 Finally, the 
Commission discussed the process of selecting and nominating new 
independent directors and encouraged the selection of persons with the 
background, experience, and independent judgment to represent the 
interests of mutual fund investors.102 
B. Seventy-five Percent Independence Requirement 
The Corporate Governance Amendments require that at least three-
fourths of the members of a mutual fund’s board of directors be 
independent.103 The Commission asserts that a principal purpose is to 
strengthen the independent directors’ control of the mutual fund’s board of 
directors and its agenda, citing the seventy-five percent requirement in 
section 15(f) as appropriate to ensure that the independent directors can 
carry out their fiduciary requirements.104 The Commission also asserts that 
the investment adviser controls the day-to-day activities of the mutual 
fund and has significantly greater access to information about the mutual 
fund than do the independent directors, and the seventy-five percent 
independence requirement seeks to remedy this imbalance.105 
C. Independent Chairman Requirement 
The Corporate Governance Amendments require that the chairman of 
the board of directors be an independent director.106 Citing the scandals 
discussed above, the Commission asserted that a mutual fund’s board of 
directors is in a better position to protect the interests of the mutual fund 
and to fulfill the board’s obligations under the Investment Company Act, 
“when its chairman does not have the conflicts of interest inherent in the 
 100. Release No. 26,520, supra note 8, at 1387–88. 
 101. Id. at 1388–89. 
 102. Id. at 1389. 
 103. Id. at 1389–90. 
 104. Id. at 1390. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1391. 
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role of an executive of the fund adviser.”107 The Commission commented 
that a board chairman can: (i) “play an important role in setting the agenda 
of the board and in establishing a boardroom culture that can foster the 
type of meaningful dialogue between fund management and the 
independent directors that is critical for healthy fund governance”; (ii) 
“play an important role in providing a check on the adviser” and providing 
leadership; and (iii) best “fulfill these responsibilities when his loyalty is 
not divided between the fund and its investment adviser.”108 
D. Other Requirements 
The Corporate Governance Amendments require: (i) the board of 
directors of the mutual fund to evaluate the performance of the board and 
its committees at least annually; (ii) the independent directors to meet in a 
separate session at least once every quarter; and (iii) the independent 
directors to be authorized “to hire employees and to retain advisers and 
experts necessary to carry out their duties.”109 The Commission asserts 
that: (i) the annual self-assessment is intended to strengthen directors’ 
understanding of their role and foster better communications and greater 
cohesiveness while identifying potential weaknesses and deficiencies; (ii) 
the separate session will “give independent directors the opportunity for a 
frank and candid discussion among themselves”; and (iii) the ability to 
hire employees and others will help independent directors to deal with 
matters beyond their expertise.110  
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AMENDMENTS 
A. The SEC Does Not Have the Statutory Authority to Adopt the 
Corporate Governance Amendments and Usurped the Proper 
Legislative Role of Congress 
From 1940 through 1992, the Commission showed appropriate and 
commendable deference to Congress when it perceived that there were 
fundamental problems in the mutual fund industry that needed correcting. 
The 1970 Amendments Act was preceded by an important study 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1391–92. 
 109. Id. at 1394–95. 
 110. Id. 
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conducted by the SEC staff,111 and the 1970 and the 1975 Amendments 
Acts were each preceded by four years of lengthy hearings.112 As it relates 
to corporate governance, the Protecting Investors report113 is of a piece 
with that precedent. It is the 2001 Amendments in which the Commission 
first strayed into inappropriate activity. But by requiring that all mutual 
funds have at least a majority of independent directors on their boards and 
that the independent directors nominate and select the new independent 
directors, the 2001 Amendments were at least borrowing from the 
requirements of Rule 12b-1 that had been in place for over twenty years.  
In contrast, the Corporate Governance Amendments are cut from whole 
cloth, except to the limited extent that section 15(f) has a super-majority 
independence requirement for three years in the unusual situation where 
the investment adviser has assigned its contract to a third party. 
Historically, Congress has not differentiated between those directors who 
are interested and those who are independent for purposes of sections 
15(c) and 36(a) and has seen fit to impose unusual requirements regarding 
voting by independent directors or the number of independent directors 
who must serve on a board only where the issue was related to approval of 
the investment adviser’s contract.114 The requirement in Rule 12b-1 that a 
majority of the board of directors be independent can be rationalized and 
justified on the ground that approval of a Rule 12b-1 Plan would allow the 
investment adviser to avoid spending its own assets, the opposite side of 
the coin from approving its investment advisory contract.115 The Corporate 
Governance Amendments go well beyond that precedent by imposing 
those requirements on a mutual fund’s routine business affairs, not just 
variations of the conflict of interest with the investment adviser’s contract. 
Whether the Corporate Governance Amendments were supported by the 
comment letters or were a “good idea” or “best practices” is beside the 
point: such a significant change should have been submitted by the 
Commission to Congress with the recommendation that Congress amend 
section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act to provide that seventy-five 
 111. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. NO. 89-
2337 (1966).  
 112. The Commission’s adoption of Rule 12b-1 in 1980 could be characterized as an exception to 
this general rule, but section 12(b) itself gives the Commission express rulemaking authority and the 
obvious analogies to the requirements of sections 15(a) and 15(c) make the requirement that at least 
fifty percent of the mutual fund’s board of directors be independent seem like a proper exercise of the 
Commission’s implementing authority where the mutual fund’s assets will be used in a manner that 
obviates the need for the investment adviser to bear distribution expenses out of its own resources.  
 113. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, supra note 40. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See supra notes 26–29. 
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percent of the members of a mutual fund’s board of directors be 
independent for all purposes and under all circumstances. 
Congress was very respectful of state law when it passed and 
subsequently amended the Investment Company Act. Corporations that are 
listed on the stock exchanges voluntarily submit to various corporate 
governance practices that go well beyond the minimum requirements of 
state corporate law,116 and entities like the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) laud the high corporate governance standards that companies 
whose shares are traded on the NYSE must adhere to as an inducement to 
attract investors from around the world.117 However desirable those 
corporate governance requirements may be, they are imposed by a self-
regulatory organization and accepted by a company as one of the costs to 
be borne in exchange for ready access to the capital markets. The 
requirements in the Corporate Governance Amendments that the chairman 
of the mutual fund’s board be an independent director, that the 
independent directors meet separately at least annually, that the mutual 
fund’s directors conduct an annual self-assessment, and that the 
independent directors have access to experts may also be a “good idea” or 
“best practices,” but they are in the first instance matters for corporate law 
in the state where the mutual fund is organized.118 The fact that the 
Corporate Governance Amendments were adopted as amendments119 to 
 116. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2004), http://www.nysc.com/lcm/subsection 
_3_303A_00.shtml?printable=ye?. The Corporate Governance Standards set out in Section 303A were 
initially approved by the SEC on November 4, 2003. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving 
Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003). On 
November 3, 2004, the SEC approved cleanup and other amendments to Section 303A.  
 117. Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act 
Release No. 50,625, 84 SEC Docket 179 (Nov. 3, 2004). See NYSE, Listed Companies, 
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1089312755443.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) (“NYSE-listed 
companies are among the world’s best. They range from ‘blue-chip’ companies, to world-leaders in 
technology, to young, high-growth enterprises. They meet and adhere to the most stringent listing and 
governance requirements.”). 
 118. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes significant prohibitions and requirements on reporting 
companies. The response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act from the legal and business communities reflects 
the degree to which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits decisions that had previously just been a matter 
of reasonable business judgment for the boards of directors of reporting companies under state law.  
 119. There has only been one other instance of which the author is aware where an existing rule 
under the Investment Company Act has been amended to make it more difficult to comply with, and 
that is Rule 2a-7 regarding money market funds. See Technical Revisions to the Rules and Forms 
Regulating Money Market Funds, Securities Act Release No. 7479, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 22,921, 65 SEC Docket 2226 (Dec. 2, 1997); Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, 
Securities Act Release No. 7275, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,837, 61 SEC Docket 1244 
(Mar. 21, 1996); Amendment to Rule 2a-7 Under the Investment Company Act, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 18,177, 48 SEC Docket 1741 (May 31, 1991); Revisions to Rules Regulating Money 
Market Funds, Securities Act Release No. 6882, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,005, 48 
SEC Docket 346 (Feb. 20, 1991); Acquisition and Valuing of Certain Portfolio Instruments by 
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ten existing exemptive rules that have nothing to do with corporate 
governance is mute witness to the Commission’s lack of statutory 
authority to adopt them—they are not even an interpretation of corporate 
governance requirements already extant in the Investment Company 
Act.120 And it is no less anomalous that statutory authority intended to give 
the Commission the ability to relax statutory prohibitions in deserving 
circumstances has been used to impose additional regulatory requirements 
not otherwise extant in the statute.  
B. The Corporate Governance Amendments Were Not Adequately 
Justified 
It is hornbook law that, in adopting a rule, an administrative agency 
must explain why it is adopting the rule.121 In proposing and adopting the 
Corporate Governance Amendments, the Commission routinely cited the 
scandals from 2003–2004 as the reason why the Corporate Governance 
Amendments should be enacted.122 Accordingly, one would have expected 
to find a one-to-one relationship between the justifications for the 
Corporate Governance Amendments and the principal features of the 
scandals in 2003–2004. One feature of the scandals was exploitation of 
anomalies in mutual fund pricing that caused “stale” prices. Another 
feature was the willingness of intermediaries—banks, broker-dealers, and 
third-party administrators to violate the federal securities laws (including 
Rule 22c-1) and their contractual commitment to comply with the law in 
the selling agreement with the mutual fund’s distributor. Yet another 
feature is the offering of preferred partners programs where the method of 
payment is “revenue-sharing,” something that was not illegal in 2003-
2004 and is not illegal today when paid by the investment adviser out of 
its own resources. The Commission made no attempt, however, to provide 
such one-to-one justifications.  
Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 14,983, 35 SEC Docket 324 
(Mar. 12, 1986); Withdrawal of Quarterly Reporting Forms and Filing Obligations of Certain 
Registered Investment Companies; Related Rule Amendments, Securities Act Release No. 6591, 
Exchange Act Release No. 22,194, Investment Company Act Release No. 14,606, 33 SEC Docket 700 
(July 1, 1985).  
 120. It could be speculated that the Commission may have chosen this route to avoid proposed 
legislative changes to the Investment Company Act that it did not support. See S. 2059, 108th Cong. 
(2004); S. 1971, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2420, 108th Cong. (2003). The fact that Congress has not 
seen fit to pass that legislation does not make the Corporate Governance Amendments any less 
inappropriate.  
 121. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). 
 122. Release No. 26,520, supra note 8, at 1385–86 & n.6. 
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With respect, it is very hard indeed to understand how a mutual fund’s 
board of directors with seventy-five percent independent directors, with an 
independent chair, meeting separately once a year, conducting an annual 
self-assessment, and having access to experts can bring the necessary skill 
set, surveillance tools, and adequate time to do due diligence to the tasks 
of (i) rooting out a determined late-trader,123 (ii) understanding the nuances 
of stock prices in a country facing a natural disaster that has imposed 
restrictions on repatriating profits, or (iii) anticipating a change in the 
Commission’s position on the payment of brokerage commissions for 
executing portfolio transactions to a broker-dealer to which it is also 
selling shares of that mutual fund.124 These tasks are more efficiently 
performed by trained professionals, like lawyers and accountants on the 
Commission’s staff with unfettered access to a mutual fund’s books and 
records, which is why Congress gave the SEC its authority to inspect 
mutual funds125 and to require that certain books and records be kept126 to 
facilitate those inspections.  
C. The Corporate Governance Amendments Will Be of Questionable 
Efficacy 
The scandals (and the harsh settlements) have surely caused 
independent directors to become even more conscious of their 
responsibilities. The fact remains that, for many, serving as an independent 
director is a less-than-full-time job, largely involving preparing for and 
attending in-person board meetings and telephone conference calls for 
which they receive an appropriate level of remuneration. While some 
independent directors may qualify as an “audit committee financial 
expert,”127 others bring to the boardroom varying backgrounds in 
 123. SEC v. Calugar Litigation Release No. 18,524, 81 SEC Docket 3044, 3044–45 (Dec. 24, 
2003) (reporting civil injunctive complaint alleging violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act 
and section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act for participation in a scheme to defraud mutual 
fund shareholders through improper late-trading and market-timing—seeking permanent injunction, 
disgorgement, and monetary penalties). For news accounts of Mr. Calugar’s late-trading activities with 
various mutual fund groups, see Riva D. Atlas, Alliance Settles Fund Trading Complaints, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at C2; Riva D. Atlas, Allied Ousts 2 Executives, Seeing a Failure to Police 
Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at C1; Riva D. Atlas, Another Fund Under Scrutiny for Trading, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at C1; Riva D. Atlas, Market Timer’s Quick Rise and Sharp Fall, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at C1; Broker Accused of Illegal Trades in Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at 
C4; Mutual Fund Manager Accused of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at C8.  
 124. See supra notes 84, 85. 
 125. Investment Company Act § 31(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(b) (2000). 
 126. Investment Company Act § 31(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a) (2000). 
 127. Section 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the Commission to adopt rules to require an 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1045 Lybecker book pages.doc4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1086 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1045 
 
 
 
 
 
 
marketing, finance, and business. Very few independent directors have a 
personal background that would equip them to manage a mutual fund or 
its investment adviser, transfer agent, fund accountant, custodian, or 
distributor. Of necessity, independent directors depend upon the 
investment adviser, the mutual fund’s independent public accountants, and 
their own legal counsel to bring important matters to their attention.128 The 
Commission seems intent upon changing the dynamics of board meetings 
and board discussions and seems persuaded that changing who (or how 
many) sit at what seat around the boardroom table will accomplish that 
goal. Even if one accepts arguendo the Commission’s assumptions and 
goal, it strains credulity to believe that adding more independent directors, 
selecting an independent chair, conducting an annual self-evaluation, 
convening separate meetings, and/or having access to experts129 can 
issuer, including a mutual fund, to disclose whether or not its audit committee has at least one member 
who is a financial expert. 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a) (Supp. II 2002).  
 128. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the Commission to adopt rules setting forth 
the minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the 
Commission in the representation of issuers. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2002). The implementing 
rules can be found at 17 C.F.R. § 205.1–205.7 (2005). 
 129. The Commission made clear in its release adopting the Corporate Governance Amendments 
that it is relying on the mutual fund’s chief compliance officer, reporting directly to the board, to 
provide the board with the information necessary to fulfill the duties that have been imposed on 
independent directors. Release No. 26,520, supra note 8, at 1393 (footnote omitted) (“A key element 
of that larger package [of regulatory reforms] is our rule requiring each [mutual] fund to designate a 
chief compliance officer who reports directly to the [mutual] fund[’s] board. With the information 
about fund compliance matters now required by our rule 38a-1, and the information about advisory 
contract renewal required by section 15(c) of the [Investment Company] Act, fund boards are better 
able to fulfill their responsibilities.”).  
 Rule 38a-1 under the Investment Company Act requires an investment company to appoint a chief 
compliance officer reporting solely to the board of directors of the mutual fund. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 
(2005). The chief compliance officer is expected to prepare written policies and procedures addressing, 
at a minimum: portfolio management processes; trading practices; personal and proprietary trading; 
custody; recordkeeping; marketing and advertising; privacy; disaster recovery; portfolio valuation; 
pricing of portfolio securities and fund shares; processing fund shares; affiliated transactions; 
protection of non-public information; fund governance requirements; and market-timing. Compliance 
Program of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,299, 81 SEC Docket 2775 (Dec. 17, 2003). These policies must be reviewed annually, compliance 
risk areas must be identified, and the effectiveness of existing policies and procedures must be 
evaluated. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4)(iii). 
 It is beyond argument that these tasks ought to be performed—what is quite arguable is whether 
the independent directors of a mutual fund are the right group of persons to be closely supervising a 
critical and important compliance function, or whether it should be the senior executive officers of the 
mutual fund’s investment adviser. It is too early to tell whether a chief compliance officer will be able 
to assemble a compliance program for a mutual fund that is as comprehensive and granular as the 
Commission’s own compliance program, particularly where the chief compliance officer will 
necessarily be more constrained in her ability to surveil activities being performed by third-parties that 
are not likely to provide as much access to the chief compliance officer as they must provide to the 
Commission’s inspection staff. Cf. Fidelity Official Describes Overlap in “Reporting Up” Rules and 
CCO Rule,” 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1115 (June 27, 2005). See generally William H. 
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produce an effective compliance program that is more than a shadowy 
substitute for and incomplete accessory to the Commission’s own robust 
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations and its experienced 
staff.  
V. THE LONG VIEW 
A. Mutual Fund Corporate Governance 
The scandals of 2003–2004 are unique in the history of the SEC’s 
administration of the Investment Company Act but appear to validate the 
concern that the Commission still has insufficient resources adequately to 
surveil the securities industry and to catch wrongdoers among those that it 
is responsible for regulating130 before serious harm has been done. As a 
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Mutual Fund and Investment Management 
Conference (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031405whd.htm (discussing of 
proposed CCO outreach program intended to enable the Commission to better communicate and 
coordinate with CCOs: “The CCO guides, leads, and implements the firm’s overall compliance 
program. Most importantly, fund CCOs are the eyes and ears of the board on matters of compliance. 
We view CCOs as our allies in our parallel mission to protect investors, so we want to assist CCOs to 
fulfill their function. . . . Let me say a word, however, about what the CCO Outreach program is not. It 
is not an effort by the Commission to re-write the fund’s reporting structure—fund CCOs continue to 
report to the fund’s board. It also is not an effort to ‘deputize’ CCOs as agents of the SEC.”).  
 130. The SEC is not responsible for regulating every wrongdoer that contributed to the scandals of 
2003–2004. For example, banks and third-party administrators are not currently subject to the 
Commission’s jurisdiction as broker-dealers or transfer agents. Indeed, one of the key elements of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was the provisions in Title II thereof that would give the Commission 
jurisdiction over retail bank brokerage activities while excluding certain brokerage activities 
traditionally engaged in by banks. § 231, 15 U.S.C. 78q(i)-(j) (2000). See Definition of Terms in and 
Specific Exemptions for Banks, Savings Associations, and Savings Banks Under Sections 3(a)(4) and 
3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 47,364, 79 SEC Docket 
1839 (Feb. 13, 2003) (adoption of final “dealer” rules); Regulation B, Exchange Act Release No. 
49,879, 83 SEC Docket 75 (June 17, 2004) (proposed “broker” rules). The Commission’s “push-out” 
rules have been very controversial and have been criticized by the Federal bank regulatory agencies 
and others. See Judith Burns, SEC Will Take Additional Time to Ponder Bank Brokerage Rules, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2004, at C6; Banking Regulators Blast SEC Proposal, Urge Delay for Rule on 
Securities Activities, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1859 (Oct. 18, 2004); Federal Bank Regulators 
Find Ample Room for Improvement in Broker-Dealer Proposal, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1159 
(June 28, 2004); Institutions Hopeful of Longer Time Frame to Comply with Rule on Securities 
Activities, 85 Banking Rep. (BNA) 6 (July 4, 2005); Damian Paletta, Latest SEC Spat Renews Old One 
over “Push-Outs”, AM. BANKER, Oct. 18, 2004, at 1 (describing letter from top members of the House 
Financial Services Committee urging that Regulation B be abandoned and the SEC instead work with 
Federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies on a compromise); Damian Paletta, Reg B: Ripe for 
Litigation, AM. BANKER, Apr. 18, 2005, at 1; SEC Delays Compliance on Push-Out Rule; Fourteen 
From Senate Banking Urge Rewrite, 84 Banking Rep. (BNA) 480 (Mar. 14, 2005) (reporting a letter 
signed by 14 Senators advising the SEC to rewrite Regulation B and inviting public comment—the 
current proposal is “burdensome and wholly unjustifiable”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Extends Time 
for Banks to Comply with Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Broker Registration Requirements (Sept. 9, 
2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-130.htm (extending the exemption until September 30, 
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practical matter, the Commission appears to be attempting to enlist mutual 
fund independent directors into its compliance program, deputizing them 
with new day-to-day responsibilities. To the extent that the Commission is 
“outsourcing” its compliance responsibilities to independent directors (and 
not just to the mutual fund’s chief compliance officer), it is asking them to 
do and be responsible for tasks that they are structurally and personally ill-
equipped to perform, individually and collectively. The day-to-day 
management of the compliance function belongs with the mutual fund’s 
investment adviser: no one knows the “ins-and-outs” of a mutual fund’s 
operations better than the adviser’s experienced senior executives.  
The Commission dismissed the many thoughtful suggestions that were 
submitted in comment letters in response to the Corporate Governance 
Amendments.131 These suggestions included the designation of a lead 
independent director, increased reliance on board committees chaired by 
independent directors, and disclosure by a mutual fund of whether or not it 
has an interested or independent director as the chairman of its board of 
directors. It would have been preferable if the Commission had followed 
its usual approach of cautious gradualism—it declared the 2001 
Amendments to have been unsuccessful132 a scant two years after they had 
first been imposed, hardly a sufficient period of time to determine the 
results of most scientific experiments. Law is not a science, but a better 
decision might well have been to let the experiment begun with the 2001 
Amendments have more time to run its course while strongly encouraging 
the boards of directors of mutual funds to pursue the alternatives that were 
rejected by the Commission.  
B. The Regulatory Problems Behind the Scandals 
The core regulatory problems underlying the scandals of 2003-2004 
were abuse of Rule 22c-1, aggravated by “stale” prices in the NAV and 
aggressive use of a mutual fund’s brokerage transactions to provide an 
2006); Press Release, SEC, SEC Extends Time for Banks to Comply with Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
Broker Registration Requirements, (Nov. 2, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-151.htm 
(announcing extension of temporary exemption until March 31, 2005).  
 131. The release adopting the Corporate Governance Amendments explicitly addressed just three 
suggestions, and it dismissed them in a single paragraph. Release No. 26,520, supra note 8, at 1393–94 
(“We carefully considered alternatives suggested to us by commenters, including designation of a lead 
independent director and increased reliance on board committees chaired by independent directors. . . . 
Commenters recommended a variety of other alternatives, including having the audit committee chair 
set the agenda.”).  
 132. Id. at 1384 (“[W]e now believe that the 2001 [A]mendments do not go far enough in 
addressing the need for independent fund boards.”). 
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impetus to selling activities by broker-dealers and their registered 
representatives. With respect to “revenue-sharing,” the Commission has 
now prohibited the use of directed-brokerage and has proposed new rules 
and rule amendments that would significantly enhance the point-of-sale 
and confirmation disclosures that would be made by broker-dealers to 
investors.  
The Commission has not yet adopted its proposed amendments to Rule 
22c-1. The late-trading that was exposed in 2003-2004 has been, and 
should continue to be, a matter of civil and criminal enforcement with 
respect to wrongdoers or illegal activities. If every investment adviser or 
broker-dealer involved in the scandals had been screening for market-
timing transactions in compliance with prospectuses and/or had actively 
discouraged abusive market-timing activities, and if each of the 
intermediaries providing “batched” net orders to the mutual fund’s transfer 
agent had been in compliance with Rule 22c-1 and their contract with the 
mutual fund’s principal underwriter, there would not have been any need 
for the Commission to consider proposing a “hard close” at 4:00 p.m. 
Eastern Time. There is no serious question that a “hard 4:00 p.m. close” 
will be disadvantageous to numerous classes of investors in mutual 
funds.133 It is poor public policy to adopt a rule that will disadvantage so 
many investors. The Commission’s ongoing insistence that mutual fund 
directors “fair value” securities is similarly misguided—that is a subjective 
task that will not ever squeeze every last opportunity for arbitrage out of a 
mutual fund’s NAV.  
A far better solution to both problems is to allow mutual funds whose 
investment objective permits them to purchase and hold portfolio 
securities where a market quotation is not readily obtainable to use the 
next day’s price, i.e. Trade Date plus one (T+1) when the investment 
adviser doubts that the prices being obtained are the prices that would be 
received if the security were to be sold. It is one thing to attempt arbitrage 
on an overnight basis and another thing entirely to make a bet that will 
take two days to unfold. To the extent that the Commission believes that it 
is transcendently important to mutual fund investors to be able to read 
yesterday’s closing prices in this morning’s Wall Street Journal so that 
trading information is instantly available, it should be noted that every 
investor whose trade is executed on the NYSE other than at the closing 
price must get that information from his broker or wait for receipt of her 
confirmation. It seems a much better public policy to adopt a T+1 trading 
 133. See supra note 65. 
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requirement in Rule 22c-1 and ask all of the mutual fund’s shareholders to 
live with the slightly delayed receipt of information than to impose a “hard 
4:00 p.m. close” to the acute disadvantage of so many.  
With respect to redemption fees, the Commission should rest now that 
it has adopted new Rule 22c-2. It was important to empower a mutual 
fund’s board of directors to tailor its redemption policy, size of redemption 
fee, and duration of its “stand-still” period to the circumstances that the 
board of directors believes that it is facing; however, standardization 
among mutual funds on any one of those points is, at best, a decidedly 
ancillary policy or investor-protection goal and should be abandoned, at 
least for the time being. With the full authority of the Commission behind 
them and the example of the scandals from 2003–2004 so fresh in their 
minds, there is every reason to believe that boards of directors of mutual 
funds can identify and implement redemption fee policies and procedures 
that will be in a mutual fund’s best interests.  
C. The Costs Imposed by the Commission’s Rulemaking  
We have all been told that there is no such thing as a free lunch. The 
Commission has just engaged in a vigorous period of rulemaking, and 
continues to engage in numerous “sweeps”134 and inspections.135 Much of 
 134. The SEC staff describes a “sweep” as a simultaneous inspection of numerous mutual funds 
focusing on a specific issue. Some “sweeps” are conducted pursuant to a formal order of investigation 
with a generic title like, “In re Certain Mutual Fund Trading Practices” so that the SEC staff can 
exercise its subpoena enforcement authority in a federal district court if necessary. See generally 
Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Address before the 24th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. 
Corporate & Securities Law Institute (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904 
smc.htm (discussing recent enforcement actions); SEC’s Mutual Fund Exam Strategy Has Significant 
Weakness, GAO Finds, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1579 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
 135. The limits of the SEC’s statutory authority has been tested here, too. The Commission has the 
authority to require that regulated entities like mutual funds, investment advisers, and broker-dealers 
keep books and records. See, e.g., Investment Company Act § 31(a), 17 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a). As a 
technical matter, that is all that the SEC has the statutory right to inspect. See, e.g., Investment 
Company Act § 31(b)(1), 17 U.S.C. § 80a-30(b)(1) (“[a]ll records required to be maintained and 
preferred in accordance with subsection (a) shall be subject at any time and from time to time to such 
reasonable periodic, special, and other examinations by the Commission . . .”). Yet, especially since 
Fall 2003, the SEC staff has “requested” or issued subpoenas demanding the creation of information, 
in computer-readable formats, that is not required to be kept by an existing rule or regulation. The 
most obvious example is email, where the “requests” that have been made have been extremely 
expensive to respond to. It is the unusual regulated entity that wants to pick a fight with its regulator, 
so investment advisers and broker-dealers have largely cooperated with these “requests,” for good 
business reasons. See Banc of America Inv. Serv’s., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51,852, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2396, 85 SEC Docket 1975 (June 15, 2005) (alleging violations 
of section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-4 thereunder and section 204 of the Advisers Act 
and Rule 204-2 thereunder for failure to maintain adequate systems and procedures for the 
preservation of email communications—civil money penalties of $1.5 million); J. P. Morgan Securities 
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the cost of the rulemaking, such as the salary for a chief compliance 
officer and the increased compensation that will inevitably flow from the 
expanded duties and responsibilities of boards of directors, will be borne 
directly by mutual fund shareholders. Other costs, such as those associated 
with the “sweeps” and inspections, are less obvious but just as harmful—it 
is the rare mutual fund group that has not been asked to respond to one 
“sweep” or another, generally on a very expedited schedule and with the 
attendant devotion of scarce resources to accomplish the task. The last two 
years have imposed an enormous time burden and significant financial toll 
on investment advisers’ management and compliance personnel. While the 
mutual fund industry has endured severe pressure from the Commission’s 
extensive rulemakings and expansive “sweeps,” it does not take a 
Nostradamus to predict that the result will be further consolidation within 
the securities industry. And it would be a fearless entrepreneur who would 
now seek to enter the mutual fund industry and bear the skyrocketing costs 
of creating and maintaining a vibrant and robust compliance infrastructure 
without serious prospects for having at least $20–$30 billion in assets 
under management in very short order.  
The Commission is charged by law with assessing the costs and 
benefits of its rulemaking.136 Because that is an event-by-event 
responsibility associated with each individual rulemaking, the 
Commission now needs to reexamine and reassess what it has wrought 
cumulatively in the cold light of day137 and determine whether the new 
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51,200, 84 SEC Docket 2989 (Feb. 14, 2005) (alleging violations of 
section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-4 thereunder for failure to preserve email for two 
years in an easily accessible place—civil money penalties of $2.1 million, payable one-third each to 
the SEC, NYSE, and NASD); J.P. Morgan Securities Settles Charges over E-Mail for $2.1M Total to 
SEC, SROs, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 310 (Feb. 21, 2005); “Prompt” Response to E-Mail 
Request Poses Retention, Other Issues for Advisers, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 400 (Mar. 1, 2005) 
(reporting discussion at IA Compliance Best Practices Summit of current email requests from the SEC 
staff and proposed methods of complying with those requests); UBS Agrees to Pay $2.1 Million After 
SEC, SROs Investigate E-Mail Retention, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1224 (July 18, 2005).  
 Now that the crisis atmosphere has abated somewhat, it would be an appropriate time for the 
Commission to reconsider the inspection practices that have been engaged in, and review and revise its 
record-keeping regulations. An inspection program at or beyond the limits of its statutory authority 
may be a necessary evil in a crisis, but does not engender respect for anything other than the exercise 
of raw power and is not an attractive feature of a governmental agency that is itself charged with 
enforcing laws. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (consideration of promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation); Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2000); Investment Company Act 
§ 2(c). Interestingly, staff from the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis estimated that implementing 
Rule 22c-2 with respect to redemption fees would cost the mutual fund industry $630 million in its 
first three years, including one-time start-up costs. SEC Gives Funds Redemption Fee Option, but 
Requires Contracts with Intermediaries, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 393, 394 (Mar. 7, 2005). 
 137. To identify an obvious example, consider the harm that has been done to the concept of a 
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regulatory framework that will emerge from this experience will support a 
mutual fund industry that can effectively and efficiently perform its vital 
business function for the benefit of investors in a cost-effective manner. It 
would be wrong for the crisis of the moment, and the immediate reaction 
to it, to drive decisions that will, in the long run, not be in the best interests 
of investors. This surely counsels that the Commission let developments 
have a reasonable opportunity to play out before any additional costs or 
requirements are considered or imposed.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission should suspend the 
effective date of the Corporate Governance Amendments and seriously 
reconsider whether there are not better, more effective methods for 
clear, simple, consumer-friendly prospectus in “plain English.” See Registration Form Used by Open-
End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7398, Exchange Act Release No. 
38,346, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,528, 63 SEC Docket 2293 (Feb. 27, 1997) 
(prospectus simplification and profile prospectus); Improving Descriptions of Risk by Mutual Funds 
and Other Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7153, Exchange Act Release No. 
35,546, Investment Company Act Release No. 20,974, 58 SEC Docket 2740 (Mar. 29, 1995). There is 
now mandatory disclosure of many regulatory matters in a mutual fund’s prospectus that were 
previously considered worthy of mention (if at all) only in a Statement of Additional Information; 
similarly, mutual fund annual reports must now discuss in numbing detail exactly what was considered 
by a board of directors in approving the investment advisory contract. Some disclosure adjustments 
were clearly necessary, but the pendulum seems to have swung a long way away from simple, 
consumer-friendly prospectuses, surely at the cost of readability and thus of actual transparency. Cf. 
Judith Burns, Prospectuses May Get a Makeover, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at C19 (reporting 
comments of Paul Roye, Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management before the Mutual 
Fund Directors Forum: “SEC will consider changes that could pare down prospectuses to two to four 
pages containing key information,” with all additional information in the Statement of Additional 
Information). See also William H. Donaldson, supra note 129: 
The final agenda item I’d like to mention is mutual fund disclosure reform. As part of the 
Commission’s ongoing point of sale initiative, we have received helpful input from 
commenters, including investor focus groups. They have delivered one unmistakable 
message: investors want straightforward, simple disclosure about their mutual fund 
investments. We continue to search for the best method of informing investors about broker 
conflicts and compensation. Ideally, we’d like to minimize the costs to the broker-dealer and 
fund industries, and at the same time not force the delivery of so much information to 
investors that they end up ignoring the most important parts of it. These should not be 
irreconcilable goals. . . . From a broader perspective, I have asked the staff to carry out a top-
to-bottom review of the mutual fund disclosure regime and how we can maximize its 
effectiveness on behalf of fund investors. Few would disagree that many mutual fund 
disclosure documents are too long and complicated. Investors need disclosure that is clear, 
understandable, and in a usable format in order to make informed investment decisions. 
See also SEC Mulling Voluntary Redemption Fee, IGNITES, Feb. 17, 2005 (“Also at the [Mutual Fund 
Directors Forum this week], [SEC Chairman William] Donaldson said he has asked [C]ommission 
staff to study how to make fund disclosure simpler to understand. Investors need clear disclosure in a 
usable format, he said, but too many disclosure documents are too long and complicated.”). 
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achieving the compliance goals that it endorses. Similarly, the proposed 
amendments to Rule 22c-1 should be abandoned. Finally, the Commission 
should, consistent with its responsibility for administering the Investment 
Company Act in the best interest of investors, continue its laudable efforts 
to provide leadership in restoring the confidence of America’s investors in 
the mutual fund industry. 
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